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Abstract
We present a new algorithm for probabilistic planning with no observability. Our algorithm,
called Probabilistic-FF, extends the heuristic forward-search machinery of Conformant-FF to prob-
lems with probabilistic uncertainty about both the initial state and action effects. Specifically,
Probabilistic-FF combines Conformant-FF’s techniques with a powerful machinery for weighted
model counting in (weighted) CNFs, serving to elegantly define both the search space and the
heuristic function. Our evaluation of Probabilistic-FF shows its fine scalability in a range of prob-
abilistic domains, constituting a several orders of magnitude improvement over previous results in
this area. We use a problematic case to point out the main open issue to be addressed by further
research.
1. Introduction
In this paper we address the problem of probabilistic planning with no observability (Kushmerick,
Hanks, & Weld, 1995), also known in the AI planning community as conditional (Majercik &
Littman, 2003) or conformant (Hyafil & Bacchus, 2004) probabilistic planning. In such problems
we are given an initial belief state in the form of a probability distribution over the world states W ,
a set of actions (possibly) having probabilistic effects, and a set of alternative goal states WG ⊆W .
A solution to such a problem is a single sequence of actions that transforms the system into one
of the goal states with probability exceeding a given threshold θ. The basic assumption of the
problem is that the system cannot be observed at the time of plan execution. Such a setting is
useful in controlling systems with uncertain initial state and non-deterministic actions, if sensing is
expensive or unreliable. Non-probabilistic conformant planning may fail due to non-existence of a
plan that achieves the goals with 100% certainty. Even if there is such a plan, that plan does not
necessarily contain information about what actions are most useful to achieve only the requested
threshold θ.
The state-of-the-art performance of probabilistic planners has been advancing much more slowly
than that of deterministic planners, scaling from 5-10 step plans for problems with≈20 world states
to 15-20 step plans for problems with ≈100 world states (Kushmerick et al., 1995; Majercik &
Littman, 1998; Hyafil & Bacchus, 2004). Since probabilistic planning is inherently harder than its
deterministic counterpart (Littman, Goldsmith, & Mundhenk, 1998), such a difference in evolution
rates is by itself not surprising. However, recent developments in the area (Onder, Whelan, & Li,
2006; Bryce, Kambhampati, & Smith, 2006; Huang, 2006), and in particular our work here, show
that dramatic improvements in probabilistic planning can be obtained.
c©2007 AI Access Foundation. All rights reserved.
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In this paper we introduce Probabilistic-FF, a new probabilistic planner based on heuristic for-
ward search in the space of implicitly represented probabilistic belief states. The planner is a natural
extension of the recent (non-probabilistic) conformant planner Conformant-FF (Hoffmann & Braf-
man, 2006). The main trick is to replace Conformant-FF’s SAT-based techniques with a recent
powerful technique for probabilistic reasoning by weighted model counting (WMC) in proposi-
tional CNFs (Sang, Beame, & Kautz, 2005). In more detail, Conformant-FF does a forward search
in a belief space in which each belief state corresponds to a set of world states considered to be
possible. The main trick of Conformant-FF is the use of CNF formulas for an implicit represen-
tation of belief states. Implicit, in this context, means that formulas φ(a) encode the semantics of
executing action sequence a in the initial belief state, with propositional variables corresponding to
facts with time-stamps. Any actual knowledge about the belief states has to be (and can be) inferred
from these formulas. Most particularly, a fact p is known to be true in a belief state if and only if
φ(a) → p(m), where m is the time endpoint of the formula. The only knowledge computed by
Conformant-FF about belief states are these known facts, as well as (symmetrically) the facts that
are known to be false. This suffices to do STRIPS-style planning, that is, to determine applicable
actions and goal belief states. In the heuristic function, FF’s (Hoffmann & Nebel, 2001) relaxed
planning graph technique is enriched with approximate SAT reasoning.
The basic ideas underlying Probabilistic-FF are:
(i) Define time-stamped Bayesian networks (BNs) describing probabilistic belief states.
(ii) Extend Conformant-FF’s belief state CNFs to model these BNs.
(iii) In addition to the SAT reasoning used by Conformant-FF, use weighted model-counting to
determine whether the probability of the (unknown) goals in a belief state is high enough.
(iv) Introduce approximate probabilistic reasoning into Conformant-FF’s heuristic function.
Note the synergetic effect: Probabilistic-FF re-uses all of Conformant-FF’s technology to recognize
facts that are true or false with probability 1. This fully serves to determine applicable actions, as
well as detect whether part of the goal is already known. In fact, it is as if Conformant-FF’s CNF-
based techniques were specifically made to suit the probabilistic setting: while without probabilities
one could imagine successfully replacing the CNFs with BDDs, with probabilities this seems much
more problematic.
The algorithms we present cover probabilistic initial belief states given as Bayesian networks,
deterministic and probabilistic actions, conditional effects, and standard action preconditions. Our
experiments show that our approach is quite effective in a range of domains. In contrast to the
SAT and CSP based approaches mentioned above (Majercik & Littman, 1998; Hyafil & Bacchus,
2004), Probabilistic-FF can find 100-step plans for problem instances with billions of world states.
However, such a comparison is not entirely fair due to the different nature of the results provided; the
SAT and CSP based approaches provide guarantees on the length of the solution. The approach most
closely related to Probabilistic-FF is implemented in POND (Bryce et al., 2006): this system, like
Probabilistic-FF, does conformant probabilistic planning for a threshold θ, using a non-admissible,
planning-graph based heuristic to guide the search. Hence a comparison between Probabilistic-FF
and POND is fair, and in our experiments we perform a comparative evaluation of Probabilistic-FF
and POND. While the two approaches are related, there are significant differences in the search
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space representation, as well as in the definition and computation of the heuristic function.1 We run
the two approaches on a range of domains partly taken from the probabilistic planning literature,
partly obtained by enriching conformant benchmarks with probabilities, and partly obtained by
enriching classical benchmarks with probabilistic uncertainty. In almost all cases, Conformant-FF
outperforms POND by at least an order of magnitude. We make some interesting observations
regarding the behavior of the two planners; in particular we identify a domain – derived from the
classical Logistics domain – where both approaches fail to scale. The apparent reason is that neither
approach is good enough at detecting how many times, at an early point in the plan, a probabilistic
action must be applied in order to sufficiently support a high goal threshold at the end of the plan.
Devising methods that are better in this regard is the most pressing open issue in this line of work.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section provides the technical background, formally
defining the problem we address and illustrating it with our running example. Section 3 details how
probabilistic belief states are represented as time-stamped Bayesian networks, how these Bayesian
networks are encoded as weighted CNF formulas, and how the necessary reasoning is performed
on this representation. Section 4 explains and illustrates our extension of Conformant-FF’s heuris-
tic function to the probabilistic settings. Section 5 provides the empirical results, and Section 6
concludes. All proofs are moved into Appendix A.
2. Background
The probabilistic planning framework we consider adds probabilistic uncertainty to a subset of
the classical ADL language, namely (sequential) STRIPS with conditional effects. Such STRIPS
planning tasks are described over a set of propositions P as triples (A, I,G), corresponding to the
action set, initial world state, and goals. I and G are sets of propositions, where I describes a
concrete initial state wI , while G describes the set of goal states w ⊇ G. Actions a are pairs
(pre(a), E(a)) of the precondition and the (conditional) effects. A conditional effect e is a triple
(con(e), add(e), del(e)) of (possibly empty) proposition sets, corresponding to the effect’s con-
dition, add, and delete lists, respectively. The precondition pre(a) is also a proposition set, and
an action a is applicable in a world state w if w ⊇ pre(a). If a is not applicable in w, then
the result of applying a to w is undefined. If a is applicable in w, then all conditional effects
e ∈ E(a) with w ⊇ con(e) occur. Occurrence of a conditional effect e in w results in the world
state w ∪ add(e) \ del(e).
If an action a is applied to w, and there is a proposition q such that q ∈ add(e) ∩ del(e′) for
(possibly the same) occurring e, e′ ∈ E(a), then the result of applying a in w is undefined. Thus,
we require the actions to be not self-contradictory, that is, for each a ∈ A, and every e, e′ ∈ E(a),
if there exists a world state w ⊇ con(e) ∪ con(e′), then add(e) ∩ del(e′) = ∅. Finally, an action
sequence a is a plan if the world state that results from iterative execution of a’s actions, starting in
wI , leads to a goal state w ⊇ G.
2.1 Probabilistic Planning
Our probabilistic planning setting extends the above with (i) probabilistic uncertainty about the
initial state, and (ii) actions that can have probabilistic effects. In general, probabilistic planning
1. POND does not use implicit belief states, and the probabilistic part of its heuristic function uses sampling techniques,
rather than the probabilistic reasoning techniques we employ.
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tasks are quadruples (A, bI , G, θ), corresponding to the action set, initial belief state, goals, and
acceptable goal satisfaction probability. As before, G is a set of propositions. The initial state is
no longer assumed to be known precisely. Instead, we are given a probability distribution over the
world states, bI , where bI(w) describes the likelihood of w being the initial world state.
Similarly to classical planning, actions a ∈ A are pairs (pre(a), E(a)), but the effect set E(a)
for such a has richer structure and semantics. Each e ∈ E(a) is a pair (con(e),Λ(e)) of a propo-
sitional condition and a set of probabilistic outcomes. Each probabilistic outcome ε ∈ Λ(e) is a
triplet (Pr(ε), add(ε), del(ε)), where add and delete lists are as before, and Pr(ε) is the proba-
bility that outcome ε occurs as a result of effect e. Naturally, we require that probabilistic effects
define probability distributions over their outcomes, that is,
∑
ε∈Λ(e) Pr(ε) = 1. The special case of
deterministic effects e is modeled this way via Λ(e) = {ε} and Pr(ε) = 1. Unconditional actions
are modeled as having a single effect e with con(e) = ∅. As before, if a is not applicable in w,
then the result of applying a to w is undefined. Otherwise, if a is applicable in w, then there exists
exactly one effect e ∈ E(a) such that con(e) ⊆ w, and for each ε ∈ Λ(e), applying a to w results
in w ∪ add(ε) \ del(ε) with probability Pr(ε). The likelihood [b, a] (w′) of a world state w′ in the
belief state [b, a], resulting from applying a probabilistic action a in b, is given by
[b, a] (w′) =
∑
w⊇pre(a)
b(w)
∑
ε∈Λ(e)
Pr(ε) · δ
(
w′ = w ∪ s \ s′, s ⊆ add(ε), s′ ⊆ del(ε)
)
, (1)
where e is the effect of a such that con(e) ⊆ w, and δ(·) is the Kronecker step function that takes
the value 1 if the argument predicate evaluates to TRUE, and 0 otherwise.
Our formalism covers all the problem-description features supported by the previously proposed
formalisms for conformant probabilistic planning (Kushmerick et al., 1995; Majercik & Littman,
1998; Hyafil & Bacchus, 2004; Onder et al., 2006; Bryce et al., 2006; Huang, 2006), and it cor-
responds to what is called Unary Nondeterminism (1ND) normal form (Rintanen, 2003). We note
that there are more succinct forms for specifying probabilistic planning problems (Rintanen, 2003),
yet 1ND normal form appears to be most intuitive from the perspective of knowledge engineering.
Example 1 Say we have a robot and a block that physically can be at one of two locations. This
information is captured by the propositions r1, r2 for the robot, and b1, b2 for the block, respec-
tively. The robot can either move from one location to another, or do it while carrying the block.
If the robot moves without the block, then its move is guaranteed to succeed. This provides us
with a pair of symmetrically defined deterministic actions {move-right,move-left}. The ac-
tion move-right has an empty precondition, and a single conditional effect e = ({r1}, {ε}) with
Pr(ε) = 1, add(ε) = {r2}, and del(ε) = {r1}. If the robot tries to move while carrying the block,
then this move succeeds with probability 0.7, while with probability 0.2 the robot ends up moving
without the block, and with probability 0.1 this move of the robot fails completely. This provides us
with a pair of (again, symmetrically defined) probabilistic actions {move-b-right,move-b-left}.
The action move-b-right has an empty precondition, and two conditional effects specified as in
Table 1.
Having specified the semantics and structure of all the components of (A, bI , G, θ) but θ, we are
now ready to specify the actual task of probabilistic planning in our setting. Recall that our actions
transform probabilistic belief states to belief states. For any action sequence a ∈ A∗, and any belief
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E(a) con(e) Λ(e) Pr(ε) add(ε) del(ε)
ε1 0.7 {r2, b2} {r1, b1}
e r1 ∧ b1 ε2 0.2 {r2} {r1}
ε3 0.1 ∅ ∅
e′ ¬r1 ∨ ¬b1 ε
′
1 1.0 ∅ ∅
Table 1: Possible effects and outcomes of the action move-b-right in Example 1.
state b, the new belief state [b, a] resulting from applying a at b is given by
[b, a] =


b, a = 〈〉
[b, a] , a = 〈a〉, a ∈ A
[[b, a] , a′] , a = 〈a〉 · a′, a ∈ A, a′ 6= ∅
. (2)
In such setting, achieving G with certainty is typically unrealistic. Hence, θ specifies the required
lower bound on the probability of achieving G. A sequence of actions a is called a plan if we have
ba(G) ≥ θ for the belief state ba = [bI , a].
2.2 Specifying the Initial Belief State
Considering the initial belief state, practical considerations force us to limit our attention only to
compactly representable probability distributions bI . While there are numerous alternatives for
compact representation of structured probability distributions, Bayes networks (BNs) (Pearl, 1988)
to date is by far the most popular such representation model.2 Therefore, in Probabilistic-FF we
assume that the initial belief state bI is described by a BN NbI over our set of propositions P.
As excellent introductions to BNs abound (e.g., see Jensen, 1996), it suffices here to briefly
define our notation. A BN N = (G,T ) represents a probability distribution as a directed acyclic
graph G, where its set of nodes X stands for random variables (assumed discrete in this paper),
and T , a set of tables of conditional probabilities (CPTs)—one table TX for each node X ∈ X .
For each possible value x ∈ Dom(X) (where Dom(X) denotes the domain of X), the table TX
lists the probability of the event X = x given each possible value assignment to all of its immediate
ancestors (parents) Pa(X) in G. Thus, the table size is exponential in the in-degree of X. Usually, it
is assumed either that this in-degree is small (Pearl, 1988), or that the probabilistic dependence of X
on Pa(X) induces a significant local structure allowing a compact representation of TX (Shimony,
1993, 1995; Boutilier, Friedman, Goldszmidt, & Koller, 1996). (Otherwise, representation of the
distribution as a BN would not be a good idea in the first place.) The joint probability of a complete
assignment ϑ to the variables X is given by the product of |X | terms taken from the respective
CPTs (Pearl, 1988):
Pr(ϑ) =
∏
X∈X
Pr (ϑ[X] | ϑ[Pa(X)]) =
∏
X∈X
TX (ϑ[X] | ϑ[Pa(X)]) ,
where ϑ[·] stands for the partial assignment provided by ϑ to the corresponding subset of X .
2. While BNs are our choice here, our framework can support other models as well, e.g. stochastic decision trees.
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In Probabilistic-FF we allow NbI to be described over the multi-valued variables underlying
the planning problem. This significantly simplifies the process of specifying NbI since the STRIPS
propositions P do not correspond to the true random variables underlying problem specification.3
Specifically, let
⋃k
i=1 Pi be a partition of P such that each proposition set Pi uniquely corresponds
to the domain of a multi-valued variable underlying our problem. That is, for every world state w
and every Pi, if |Pi| > 1, then there is exactly one proposition q ∈ Pi that holds in w. The variables
of the BN NbI describing our initial belief state bI are X = {X1, . . . ,Xk}, where Dom(Xi) = Pi
if |Pi| > 1, and Dom(Xi) = {q,¬q} if Pi = {q}.
Example 2 For an illustration of such NbI , consider our running example, and say the robot is
known to be initially at one of the two possible locations with probability Pr(r1) = 0.9 and
Pr(r2) = 0.1. Suppose there is a correlation in our belief about the initial locations of the robot and
the block. We believe that, if the robot is at r1, then Pr(b1) = 0.7 (and Pr(b2) = 0.3), while if the
robot is at r2, then Pr(b1) = 0.2 (and Pr(b2) = 0.8). The initial belief state BNNbI is then defined
over two variables R (“robot”) and B (“block”) withDom(R) = {r1, r2} and Dom(B) = {b1, b2},
respectively, and it is depicted in Figure 1.
r1 r2
0.9 0.1
R // B
b1 b2
r1 0.7 0.3
r2 0.2 0.8
Figure 1: Bayes network NbI for Example 1.
It is not hard to see that our STRIPS-style actions a ∈ A can be equivalently specified in terms
of the multi-valued variables X . Specifically, if |Pi| > 1, then no action a can add a proposition
q ∈ Pi without deleting some other proposition q′ ∈ Pi, and thus, we can consider a as setting
Xi = q. If |Pi| = 1, then adding and deleting q ∈ Pi has the standard semantics of setting Xi = q
and Xi = ¬q, respectively. For simplicity of presentation, we assume that our actions are not self-
contradictory at the level of X as well—if two conditional effects e, e′ ∈ E(a) can possibly occur in
some world state w, then the subsets of X affected by these two effects have to be disjoint. Finally,
our goal G directly corresponds to a partial assignment to X (unless our G is self-contradictory,
requiring q ∧ q′ for some q, q′ ∈ Pi.)
3. Belief States
In this section, we explain our representation of, and reasoning about, belief states. We first explain
how probabilistic belief states are represented as time-stamped BNs, then we explain how those
BNs are encoded and reasoned about in the form of weighted CNF formulas. This representation
of belief states by weighted CNFs is then illustrated on the belief state from our running example in
Figure 2. We finally provide the details about how this works in Probabilistic-FF.
3. SpecifyingNbI directly over P would require identifying the multi-valued variables anyway, followed by connecting
all the propositions corresponding to a multi-valued variable by a complete DAG, and then normalizing the CPTs of
these propositions in a certain manner.
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r1 r2
0.9 0.1
r1 r2
ε1 ∨ ε2 0 1
ε3∨ε
′
1
r1 1 0
r2 0 1
r1 r2
r1 1 0
r2 1 0
R(0)

//
$$I
II
II
II
II
I
R(1) // R(2)
Y(1)
66nnnnnnnnnnnnnnnn
((PP
PPP
PPP
PPP
PPP
PP
ε1 ε2 ε3 ε
′
1
r1 ∧ b1 0.7 0.2 0.1 0
othrw 0 0 0 1
B(0) //
::uuuuuuuuuu
B(1) // B(2)
b1 b2
r1 0.7 0.3
r2 0.2 0.8
b1 b2
ε1 0 1
¬ε1
b1 1 0
b2 0 1
b1 b2
b1 1 0
b2 0 1
Figure 2: Bayes network Nba for our running Example 1-2 and action sequence
a = 〈move-b-right,move-left〉.
3.1 Bayesian Networks
Probabilistic-FF performs a forward search in a space of belief states. The search states are belief
states (that is, probability distributions over the world states w), and the search is restricted to belief
states reachable from the initial belief state bI through some sequences of actions a. A key decision
one should make is the actual representation of the belief states. Let bI be our initial belief state
captured by the BN NbI , and let ba be a belief state resulting from applying to bI a sequence of
actions a. One of the well-known problems in the area of decision-theoretic planning is that the
description of ba directly over the state variables X becomes less and less structured as the number
of (especially stochastic) actions in a increases. To overcome this limitation, we represent belief
states ba as a BNNba that explicitly captures the sequential application of a starting from bI , trading
the representation size for the cost of inference, compared to representing belief states directly as
distributions over world states. Below we formally specify the structure of such a BNNba , assuming
that all the actions a are applicable in the corresponding belief states of their application, and later
showing that Probabilistic-FF makes sure this is indeed the case. We note that these belief-state
BNs are similar in spirit and structure to those proposed in the AI literature for verifying that a
probabilistic plan achieves its goals with a certain probability (Dean & Kanazawa, 1989; Hanks &
McDermott, 1994; Kushmerick et al., 1995).
Figure 2 illustrates the construction of Nba for our running example with a = 〈move-b-right,
move-left〉. In general, let a = 〈a1, . . . , am〉 be a sequence of actions, numbered according to their
appearance on a. For 0 ≤ t ≤ m, let X(t) be a replica of our state variables X , with X(t) ∈ X(t)
571
DOMSHLAK & HOFFMANN
corresponding to X ∈ X . The variable set of Nba is the union of X(0), . . . ,X(m), plus some
additional variables that we introduce for the actions in a.
First, for each X(0) ∈ X(0), we set the parents Pa(X(0)) and conditional probability tables
TX(0) to simply copy these of the state variable X in NbI . Now, consider an action at from a, and
let at = a. For each such action we introduce a discrete variable Y(t) that “mediates” between the
variable layers X(t−1) and X(t). The domain of Y(t) is set to Dom(Y(t)) =
⋃
e∈E(a) Λ(e), that is, to
the union of probabilistic outcomes of all possible effects of a. The parents of Y(t) in Nba are set to
Pa(Y(t)) =
⋃
e∈E(a)
{
X(i−1) | con(e) ∩Dom(X) 6= ∅
}
, (3)
and, for each π ∈ Dom(Pa(Y(t))), we set
TY (t)(Y(i) = ε | π) =
{
Pr(ε), con (e(ε)) ⊆ π
0, otherwise
, (4)
where e(ε) denotes the effect e of a such that ε ∈ Λ(e).
We refer to the set of all such variables Y(t) created for the actions of a as Y . Now, let EX(a) ⊆
E(a) be the probabilistic effects of a that affect a variable X ∈ X . If EX(a) = ∅, then we set
Pa(X(t)) = {X(t−1)}, and
TX(t)(X(t) = x | X(t−1) = x
′) =
{
1, x = x′,
0, otherwise
. (5)
Otherwise, if EX(a) 6= ∅, let xε ∈ Dom(X) be the value provided to X by ε ∈ Λ(e), e ∈ EX(a).
Recall that the outcomes of effects E(a) are all mutually exclusive. Hence, we set Pa(X(t)) =
{X(t−1), Y(t−1)}, and
TX(i)(X(i) = x | X(i−1) = x
′, Y(i−1) = ε) =


1, e(ε) ∈ EX(a) ∧ x = xε,
1, e(ε) 6∈ EX(a) ∧ x = x
′,
0, otherwise
, (6)
where e(ε) denotes the effect responsible for the outcome ε.
It is not hard to verify that Equations 4-6 capture the frame axioms and probabilistic seman-
tics of our actions. In principle, this accomplishes our construction of Nba over the variables
Xba = Y
⋃m
t=0 X(t). We note, however, that the mediating variable Y(t) are really needed only
for truly probabilistic actions. Specifically, if at is a deterministic action a, let EX(a) ⊆ E(a) be
the conditional effects of a that add and/or delete propositions associated with the domain of a vari-
able X ∈ X . If EX(a) = ∅, then we set Pa(X(t)) = {X(t−1)}, and TX(t) according to Equation 5.
Otherwise, we set
Pa(X(t)) = {X(t−1)}
⋃
e∈EX(a)
{
X ′(t−1) | con(e) ∩Dom(X) 6= ∅
}
, (7)
and specify TX(t) as follows. Let xe ∈ Dom(X) be the value that (the only deterministic outcome
of) the effect e ∈ EX(a) provides to X. For each π ∈ Dom(Pa(X(t))), if there exists e ∈ EX(a)
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such that con(e) ⊆ π, then we set
TX(t)(X(t) = x | π) =
{
1, x = xe,
0, otherwise
(8)
Otherwise, we set
TX(t)(X(t) = x | π) =
{
1, x = π[X(t−1)],
0, otherwise
(9)
Due to the self-consistency of the action, it is not hard to verify that Equations 8-9 are consistent,
and, together with Equation 5, capture the semantics of the conditional deterministic actions. This
special treatment of deterministic actions is illustrated in Figure 2 by the direct dependencies of
X(2) on X(1).
Proposition 1 Let (A,NbI , G, θ) be a probabilistic planning problem, and a be anm-step sequence
of actions applicable in bI . Let Pr be the joint probability distribution induced by Nba on its
variables Xba . The belief state ba corresponds to the marginal distribution of Pr on X(m), that is:
ba(X ) = Pr(X(m)), and if G(m) is a partial assignment provided by G to X(m), then the probability
ba(G) that a achieves G starting from bI is equal to Pr(G(m)).
As we already mentioned, our belief-state BNs are constructed along the principles outlined
and used by Dean and Kanazawa (1989), Hanks and McDermott (1994), and Kushmerick et al.
(1995), and thus the correctness of Proposition 1 is immediate from these previous results. At this
point, it is worth bringing attention to the fact that all the variables in X(1), . . . ,X(m) are completely
deterministic. Moreover, the CPTs of all the variables of Nba are all compactly representable due to
either a low number of parents, or some local structure induced by a large amount of context-specific
independence, or both. This compactness of the CPTs in Nba is implied by the compactness of the
STRIPS-style specification of the planning actions. By exploiting this compactness of the action
specification, the size of the Nba’s description can be kept linear in the size of the input and the
number of actions in a.
Proposition 2 Let (A,NbI , G, θ) be a probabilistic planning problem described over k state vari-
ables, and a be anm-step sequence of actions fromA. Then, we have |Nba | = O(|NbI |+mα(k+1))
where α is the largest description size of an action in A.
The proof of Proposition 2, as well as the proofs of other formal claims in the paper, are relegated
to Appendix A, pp. 613.
3.2 Weighted CNFs
Given the representation of belief states as BNs, next we should select a mechanism for reasoning
about these BNs. In general, computing the probability of a query in BNs is known to be #P-
complete (Roth, 1996). In addition, it is not hard to verify, using an analysis similar to the ones
of Darwiche (2001) and Brafman and Domshlak (2006), that the networks arising in our work
will typically exhibit large tree-width. While numerous exact algorithms for inference with BNs
have been proposed in the literature (Darwiche, 2000; Dechter, 1999; Zhang & Poole, 1994), the
classical algorithms do not scale well on large networks exhibiting high tree-width. On the positive
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side, however, an observation that guides some recent advances in the area of probabilistic reasoning
is that real-world domains typically exhibit a significant degree of deterministic dependencies and
context-specific independencies between the problem variables. Targeting this property of practical
BNs already resulted in powerful inference techniques (Chavira & Darwiche, 2005; Sang et al.,
2005). The general principle underlying these techniques is to
(i) Compile a BN N into a weighted propositional logic formula φ(N ) in CNF, and
(ii) Perform an efficient weighted model counting for φ(N ) by reusing (and adapting) certain
techniques that appear powerful in enhancing backtracking DPLL-style search for SAT.
One observation we had at the early stages of developing Probabilistic-FF is that the type of
networks and type of queries we have in our problems make this machinery for solving BNs by
weighted CNF model counting very attractive for our needs. First, in Section 3.1 we have already
shown that the BNs representing our belief states exhibit a large amount of both deterministic nodes
and context-specific independence. Second, the queries of our interest correspond to computing
probability of the “evidence” G(m) in Nba , and this type of query has a clear interpretation in terms
of model counting (Sang et al., 2005). Hence, taking this route in Probabilistic-FF, we compile our
belief state BNs to weighted CNFs following the encoding scheme proposed by Sang et al. (2005),
and answer probabilistic queries using Cachet (Sang, Bacchus, Beame, Kautz, & Pitassi, 2004), one
of the most powerful systems to date for exact weighted model counting in CNFs.
In general, the weighted CNFs and the weights of such formulas are specified as follows. Let
V = {V1, . . . , Vn} be a set of propositional variables with Dom(Vi) = {vi,¬vi}, and let ̟ :⋃
iDom(Vi)→ R
0+ be a non-negative, real-valued weight function from the literals of V . For any
partial assignment π to V , the weight ̟(π) of this assignment is defined as the product of its literals’
weights, that is, ̟(π) =
∏
l∈pi̟(l). Finally, a propositional logic formula φ is called weighted if it
is defined over such a weighted set of propositional variables. For any weighted formula φ over V ,
the weight ̟(φ) is defined as the sum of the weights of all the complete assignments to V satisfying
φ, that is,
̟(φ) =
∑
pi∈Dom(V)
̟(π)δ (π |= φ),
where Dom(V) = ×iDom(Vi). For instance, if for all variables Vi we have ̟(vi) = ̟(¬vi) = 1,
then ̟(φ) simply stands for the number of complete assignments to V that satisfy φ.
Given an initial belief state BN NbI , and a sequence of actions a = 〈a1, . . . , am〉 applicable in
bI , here we describe how the weighted CNF encoding φ(Nba) (or φ(ba), for short) of the belief state
ba is built and used in Probabilistic-FF. First, we formally specify the generic scheme introduced
by Sang et al. (2005) for encoding a BN N over variables X into a weighted CNF φ(N ). The
encoding formula φ(N ) contains two sets of variables. First, for each variable Z ∈ X and each
value z ∈ Dom(Z), the formula φ(N ) contains a state proposition with literals {z,¬z}, weighted
as ̟(z) = ̟(¬z) = 1. These state propositions act in φ(ba) as regular SAT propositions. Now,
for each variable Z ∈ Xba , let Dom(Z) = {z1, . . . , zk} be an arbitrary fixed ordering of Dom(Z).
Recall that each row TZ [i] in the CPT of Z corresponds to an assignment ζi (or a set of such as-
signments) to Pa(Z). Thus, the number of rows in TZ is upper bounded by the number of different
assignments to Pa(Z), but (as it happens in our case) it can be significantly lower if the depen-
dence of Z on Pa(Z) induces a substantial local structure. Following the ordering of Dom(Z) as
above, the entry TZ [i, j] contains the conditional probability of Pr(zj | ζi). For every CPT entry
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procedure basic-WMC(φ)
if φ = ∅ return 1
if φ has an empty clause return 0
select a variable V ∈ φ
return basic-WMC(φ|v) ·̟(v) + basic-WMC(φ|¬v) ·̟(¬v)
Figure 3: Basic DPPL-style weighted model counting.
TZ [i, j] but the last one (i.e., TZ [i, k]), the formula φ(N ) contains a chance proposition with literals
{〈zij〉,¬〈z
i
j〉}. These chance variables aim at capturing the probabilistic information from the CPTs
of Nba . Specifically, the weight of the literal 〈zij〉 is set to Pr(zj | ζi,¬z1, . . . ,¬zj−1), that is to
conditional probability that the entry is true, given that the row is true, and no prior entry in the row
is true:
̟
(
〈zij〉
)
=
TZ [i, j]
1−
∑j−1
k=1 TZ [i, k]
̟
(
¬〈zij〉
)
= 1−̟
(
〈zij〉
) (10)
Considering the clauses of φ(N ), for each variable Z ∈ X , and each CPT entry TZ [i, j], the
formula φ(N ) contains a clause(
ζi ∧ ¬〈z
i
1〉 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬〈z
i
j−1〉 ∧ 〈z
i
j〉
)
→ zj , (11)
where ζi is a conjunction of the literals forming the assignment ζi ∈ Dom(Pa(Z)). These clauses
ensure that the weights of the complete assignments to the variables of φ(N ) are equal to the prob-
ability of the corresponding atomic events as postulated by the BN N . To illustrate the construction
in Equations 10-11, let boolean variables A and B be the parents of a ternary variable C (with
Dom(C) = {C1, C2, C3}) in some BN, and let Pr(C1|A,¬B) = 0.2, Pr(C2|A,¬B) = 0.4, and
Pr(C3|A,¬B) = 0.4. Let the raw corresponding to the assignment A,¬B to Pa(C) be the i-th
row of the CPT TC . In the encoding of this BN, the first two entries of this raw of TC are captured
by a pair of respective chance propositions 〈Ci1〉, and 〈Ci2〉. According to Equation 10, the weights
of these propositions are set to ̟
(
〈Ci1〉
)
= 0.2, and ̟
(
〈Ci1〉
)
= 0.41−0.2 = 0.5. Then, according to
Equation 11, the encoding contains three clauses(
¬A ∨B ∨ ¬〈Ci1〉 ∨ C1
)
(
¬A ∨B ∨ 〈Ci1〉 ∨ ¬〈C
i
2〉 ∨ C2
)
(
¬A ∨B ∨ 〈Ci1〉 ∨ 〈C
i
2〉 ∨C3
)
Finally, for each variable Z ∈ X , the formula φ(N ) contains a standard set of clauses encoding
the “exactly one” relationship between the state propositions capturing the value of Z . This accom-
plishes the encoding of N into φ(N ). In the next Section 3.3 we illustrate this encoding on the
belief state BN from our running example.
The weighted CNF encoding φ(ba) of the belief state BN Nba provides the input to a weighted
model counting procedure. A simple recursive DPPL-style procedure basic-WMC underlying Ca-
chet (Sang et al., 2004) is depicted in Figure 3, where the formula φ|v is obtained from φ by setting
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the literal v to true. Theorem 3 by Sang et al. (2005) shows that if φ is a weighted CNF encoding
of a BN N , and Pr(Q|E) is a general query with respect to N , query Q, and evidence E, then we
have:
Pr(Q|E) =
basic-WMC(φ ∧Q ∧ E)
basic-WMC(φ ∧E)
, (12)
where query Q and evidence E can in fact be arbitrary formulas in propositional logic. Note that,
in a special (and very relevant to us) case of empty evidence, Equation 12 reduces to Pr(Q) =
basic-WMC(φ∧Q), that is, a single call to the basic-WMC procedure. Corollary 3 is then immediate
from our Proposition 1 and Theorem 3 by Sang et al. (2005).
Corollary 3 Let (A, bI , G, θ) be a probabilistic planning task with a BN NbI describing bI , and a
be an m-step sequence of actions applicable in bI . The probability ba(G) that a achieves G starting
from bI is given by:
ba(G) = WMC (φ(ba) ∧G(m)) , (13)
where G(m) is a conjunction of the goal literals time-stamped with the time endpoint m of a.
3.3 Example: Weighted CNF Encoding of Belief States
We now illustrate the generic BN-to-WCNF encoding scheme of Sang et al. (2005) on the belief
state BN Nba from our running example in Figure 2.
For 0 ≤ i ≤ 2, we introduce time-stamped state propositions r1(i), r2(i), b1(i), b2(i). Likewise,
we introduce four state propositions ε1(1), ε2(1), ε3(1), ε′1(1) corresponding to the values of the
variable Y(1). The first set of clauses in φ(ba) ensure the “exactly one” relationship between the
state propositions capturing the value of a variable in Nba :(
ε1(1) ∨ ε2(1) ∨ ε3(1) ∨ ε
′
1(1)
)
,
1 ≤ i < j ≤ 4 :
(¬yi(1) ∨ ¬yj(1)) ,
0 ≤ i ≤ 2 :
(r1(i) ∨ r2(i)) , (¬r1(i) ∨ ¬r2(i))
(b1(i) ∨ b2(i)) , (¬b1(i) ∨ ¬b2(i))
(14)
Now we proceed with encoding the CPTs of Nba . The root nodes have only one row in their
CPTs so their chance propositions can be identified with the corresponding state variables (Sang
et al., 2005). Hence, for the root variable R(0) we need neither additional clauses nor special
chance propositions, but the state proposition r1(0) of φ(ba) is treated as a chance proposition
with ̟ (r1(0)) = 0.9.
Encoding of the variable B(0) is a bit more involved. The CPT TB(0) contains two (content-wise
different) rows corresponding to the “given r1” and “given r2” cases, and both these cases induce
a non-deterministic dependence of B(0) on R(0). To encode the content of TB(0) we introduce
two chance variables 〈b1(0)1〉 and 〈b1(0)2〉 with ̟(〈b1(0)1〉) = 0.7 and ̟(〈b1(0)2〉) = 0.2. The
positive literals of 〈b1(0)1〉 and 〈b1(0)2〉 capture the events “b1 given r1” and “b1 given r2”, while
the negations ¬〈b1(0)1〉 and ¬〈b1(0)2〉 capture the complementary events “b2 given r2” and “b2
given r2”, respectively. Now consider the “given r1” row in TB(0) . To encode this row, we need
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φ(ba) to contain
(
r1(0) ∧ 〈b1(0)
1〉
)
→ b1(0) and
(
r1(0) ∧ ¬〈b1(0)
1〉
)
→ b2(0). Similar encoding
is required for the row “given r2”, and thus the encoding of TB0 introduces four additional clauses:(
¬r1(0) ∨ ¬〈b1(0)
1〉 ∨ b1(0)
)
,
(
¬r1(0) ∨ 〈b1(0)
1〉 ∨ b2(0)
)
(
¬r2(0) ∨ ¬〈b1(0)
2〉 ∨ b1(0)
)
,
(
¬r2(0) ∨ 〈b1(0)
2〉 ∨ b2(0)
) (15)
Having finished with the NbI part of Nba , we proceed with encoding the variable Y(1) cor-
responding to the probabilistic action move-b-right. To encode the first row of TY(1) we in-
troduce three chance propositions 〈ε1(1)1〉, 〈ε2(1)1〉, and 〈ε3(1)1〉; in general, no chance vari-
ables are needed for the last entries of the CPT rows. The weights of these chance propositions
are set according to Equation 10 to ̟
(
〈ε1(1)
1〉
)
= 0.7, ̟
(
〈ε2(1)
1〉
)
= 0.21−0.7 = 0.6(6), and
̟
(
〈ε3(1)
1〉
)
= 0.11−0.9 = 0.1. Using these chance propositions, we add to φ(ba) four clauses as in
Equation 11, notably the first four clauses of Equation 16 below.
Proceeding the second row of TY(1) , observe that the value of R(0) and B(0) in this case fully
determines the value of Y(1). This deterministic dependence can be encoded without using any
chance propositions using the last two clauses in Equation 16.(
¬r1(0) ∨ ¬b1(0) ∨ ¬〈ε1(1)
1〉 ∨ ε1(1)
)
,(
¬r1(0) ∨ ¬b1(0) ∨ 〈ε1(1)
1〉 ∨ ¬〈ε2(1)
1〉 ∨ ε2(1)
)
,(
¬r1(0) ∨ ¬b1(0) ∨ 〈ε1(1)
1〉 ∨ 〈ε2(1)
1〉 ∨ ¬〈ε3(1)
1〉 ∨ ε3(1)
)
,(
¬r1(0) ∨ ¬b1(0) ∨ 〈ε1(1)
1〉 ∨ 〈ε2(1)
1〉 ∨ 〈ε3(1)
1〉 ∨ ε′1(1)
)
,
(
r1(0) ∨ ¬ε
′
1(1)
)
,
(
b1(0) ∨ ¬ε
′
1(1)
)
(16)
Using the state/chance variables introduced for R0, B0, and Y(1), we encode the CPTs of R(1)
and B(1) as:
R(1) : (¬ε1(1) ∨ r2(1)) , (¬ε2(1) ∨ r2(1)) ,
(¬ε3(1) ∨ ¬r1(0) ∨ r1(1)) ,
(
¬ε′1(1) ∨ ¬r1(0) ∨ r1(1)
)
,
(¬ε3(1) ∨ ¬r1(0) ∨ r1(1)) ,
(
¬ε′1(1) ∨ ¬r2(0) ∨ r2(1)
)
B(1) : (¬ε1(1) ∨ b2(1)) ,
(ε1(1) ∨ ¬b1(0) ∨ b1(1)) ,
(ε1(1) ∨ ¬b2(0) ∨ b2(1))
(17)
Since the CPTs of both R(1) and B(1) are completely deterministic, their encoding as well is using
no chance propositions. Finally, we encode the (deterministic) CPTs of R(2) and B(2) as:
R(2) : (r1(2))
B(2) : (¬b1(1) ∨ b1(2))
(¬b2(1) ∨ b2(2))
(18)
where the unary clause (r1(2)) is a reduction of (¬r1(1) ∨ r1(2)) and (¬r2(1) ∨ r1(2)). This ac-
complishes our encoding of φ(ba).
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3.4 From Conformant-FF to Probabilistic-FF
Besides the fact that weighted model counting is attractive for the kinds of BNs arising in our con-
text, the weighted CNF representation of belief states works extremely well with the ideas underly-
ing Conformant-FF (Hoffmann & Brafman, 2006). This was outlined in the introduction already;
here we give a few more details.
As stated, Conformant-FF does a forward search in a non-probabilistic belief space in which
each belief state corresponds to a set of world states considered to be possible. The main trick of
Conformant-FF is the use of CNF formulas for an implicit representation of belief states, where
formulas φ(a) encode the semantics of executing action sequence a in the initial belief state. Facts
known to be true or false are inferred from these formulas. This computation of only a partial
knowledge constitutes a lazy kind of belief state representation, in comparison to other approaches
that use explicit enumeration (Bonet & Geffner, 2000) or BDDs (Bertoli, Cimatti, Pistore, Roveri,
& Traverso, 2001) to fully represent belief states. The basic ideas underlying Probabilistic-FF are:
(i) Define time-stamped Bayesian Networks (BN) describing probabilistic belief states (Sec-
tion 3.1 above).
(ii) Extend Conformant-FF’s belief state CNFs to model these BN (Section 3.2 above).
(iii) In addition to the SAT reasoning used by Conformant-FF, use weighted model-counting to
determine whether the probability of the (unknown) goals in a belief state is high enough
(directly below).
(iv) Introduce approximate probabilistic reasoning into Conformant-FF’s heuristic function (Sec-
tion 4 below).
In more detail, given a probabilistic planning task (A, bI , G, θ), a belief state ba corresponding to
some applicable in bI m-step action sequence a, and a proposition q ∈ P, we say that q is known
in ba if ba(q) = 1, negatively known in ba if ba(q) = 0, and unknown in ba, otherwise. We begin
with determining whether each q is known, negatively known, or unknown at time m. Re-using the
Conformant-FF machinery, this classification requires up to two SAT tests of φ(ba) ∧ ¬q(m) and
φ(ba) ∧ q(m), respectively. The information provided by this classification is used threefold. First,
if a subgoal g ∈ G is negatively known at time m, then we have ba(G) = 0. On the other extreme,
if all the subgoals of G are known at time m, then we have ba(G) = 1. Finally, if some subgoals of
G are known and the rest are unknown at time m, then we accomplish evaluating the belief state ba
by testing whether
ba(G) = WMC (φ(ba) ∧G(m)) ≥ θ. (19)
Note also that having the sets of all (positively/negatively) known propositions at all time steps up
to m allows us to significantly simplify the CNF formula φ(ba) ∧ G(m) by inserting into it the
corresponding values of known propositions.
After evaluating the considered action sequence a, if we get ba(G) ≥ θ, then we are done.
Otherwise, the forward search continues, and the actions that are applicable in ba (and thus used to
generate the successor belief states) are actions whose preconditions are all known in ba.
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4. Heuristic Function
The key component of any heuristic search procedure is the heuristic function. The quality (in-
formedness) and computational cost of that function determine the performance of the search. The
heuristic function is usually obtained from solutions to a relaxation of the actual problem of in-
terest (Pearl, 1984; Russell & Norvig, 2004). In classical planning, a successful idea has been to
use a relaxation that ignores the delete effects of the actions (McDermott, 1999; Bonet & Geffner,
2001; Hoffmann & Nebel, 2001). In particular, the heuristic of the FF planning system is based on
the notion of relaxed plan, which is a plan that achieves the goals while assuming that all delete
lists of actions are empty. The relaxed plan is computed using a Graphplan-style (Blum & Furst,
1997) technique combining a forward chaining graph construction phase with a backward chaining
plan extraction phase. The heuristic value h(w) that FF provides to a world state w encountered
during the search is the length of the relaxed plan from w. In Conformant-FF, this methodology was
extended to the setting of conformant planning under initial state uncertainty (without uncertainty
about action effects). Herein, we extend Conformant-FF’s machinery to handle probabilistic initial
states and effects. Section 4.1 provides background on the techniques used in FF and Conformant-
FF, then Sections 4.2 and 4.4 detail our algorithms for the forward and backward chaining phases in
Probabilistic-FF, respectively. These algorithms for the two phases of the Probabilistic-FF heuristic
computation are illustrated on our running example in Sections 4.3 and 4.5, respectively.
4.1 FF and Conformant-FF
We specify how relaxed plans are computed in FF; we provide a coarse sketch of how they are
computed in Conformant-FF. The purpose of the latter is only to slowly prepare the reader for what
is to come: Conformant-FF’s techniques are re-used for Probabilistic-FF anyway, and hence will be
described in full detail as part of Sections 4.2 and 4.4.
Formally, relaxed plans in classical planning are computed as follows. Starting from w, FF
builds a relaxed planning graph as a sequence of alternating proposition layers P (t) and action
layers A(t), where P (0) is the same as w, A(t) is the set of all actions whose preconditions are
contained in P (t), and P (t + 1) is obtained from P (t) by including the add effects (with fulfilled
conditions) of the actions in A(t). That is, P (t) always contains those facts that will be true if one
would execute (the relaxed versions of) all actions at the earlier layers up to A(t− 1). The relaxed
planning graph is constructed either until it reaches a propositional layer P (m) that contains all
the goals, or until the construction reaches a fixpoint P (t) = P (t+ 1) without reaching the goals.
The latter case corresponds to (all) situations in which a relaxed plan does not exist, and because
existence of a relaxed plan is a necessary condition for the existence of a real plan, the state w is
excluded from the search space by setting h(w) = ∞. In the former case of G ⊆ P (m), a relaxed
plan is a subset of actions in A(1), . . . , A(m) that suffices to achieve the goals (under ignoring the
delete lists), and it can be extracted by a simple backchaining loop: For each goal in P (m), select
an action in A(1), . . . , A(m) that achieves this goal, and iterate the process by considering those
actions’ preconditions and the respective effect conditions as new subgoals. The heuristic estimate
h(w) is then set to the length of the extracted relaxed plan, that is, to the number of actions selected
in this backchaining process.
Aiming at extending the machinery of FF to conformant planning, in Conformant-FF, Hoff-
mann and Brafman (2006) suggested to extend the relaxed planning graph with additional fact lay-
ers uP (t) containing the facts unknown at time t, and then to reason about when such unknown
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facts become known in the relaxed planning graph. As the complexity of this type of reasoning is
prohibitive, Conformant-FF further relaxes the planning task by ignoring not only the delete lists,
but also all but one of the unknown conditions of each action effect. That is, if action a appears
in layer A(t), and for effect e of a we have con(e) ⊆ P (t) ∪ uP (t) and con(e) ∩ uP (t) 6= ∅,
then con(e) ∩ uP (t) is arbitrarily reduced to contain exactly one literal, and reasoning is done as if
con(e) had this reduced form from the beginning.
This relaxation converts implications (
∧
c∈con(e)∩uP (t) c(t)) → q(t + 1) that the action effects
induce between unknown propositions into their 2-projections that take the form of binary impli-
cations c(t) → q(t + 1), for arbitrary c ∈ con(e) ∩ uP (t). Due to the layered structure of the
planning graph, the set of all these binary implications c(t) → q(t + 1) can be seen as forming a
directed acyclic graph Imp. Under the given relaxations, this graph captures exactly all dependen-
cies between the truth of propositions over time. Hence, checking whether a proposition q becomes
known at time t can be done as follows. First, backchain over the implication edges of Imp that end
in q(t), and collect the set support(q(t)) of leafs4 that are reached. Then, if Φ is the CNF formula
describing the possible initial states, test by a SAT check whether
Φ→
∨
l∈support(q(t))
l
This test will succeed if and only if at least one of the leafs in support(q(t)) is true in every possible
initial state. Under the given relaxations, this is the case if and only if, when applying all actions in
the relaxed planning graph, q will always be true at time t.5
The process of extracting a relaxed plan from the constructed conformant relaxed planning
graph is an extension of FF’s respective process with machinery that selects actions responsible for
relevant paths in Imp. The overall Conformant-FF heuristic machinery is sound and complete for
relaxed tasks, and yields a heuristic function that is highly informative across a range of challenging
domains (Hoffmann & Brafman, 2006).
In this work, we adopt Conformant-FF’s relaxations, ignoring the delete lists of the action ef-
fects, as well as all but one of the propositions in the effect’s condition. Accordingly, we adopt the
following notations from Conformant-FF. Given a set of actions A, we denote by |+1 any function
from A into the set of all possible actions, such that |+1 maps each a ∈ A to the action similar to a
but with empty delete lists and with all but one conditioning propositions of each effect removed;
for |+1 (a), we write a|
+
1 . By A|
+
1 we denote the action set obtained by applying |
+
1 to all the actions
of A, that is, A|+1 =
{
a|+1 | a ∈ A
}
. For an action sequence a we denote by a|+1 the sequence of
actions obtained by applying |+1 to every action along a, that is,
a|+1 =
{
〈〉, a = 〈〉
〈a|+1 〉 · a
′|+1 , a = 〈a〉 · a
′
.
For a probabilistic planning task (A, bI , G, θ), the task (A|+1 , bI , G, θ) is called a relaxation of
(A, bI , G, θ). Finally, if a|+1 is a plan for (A|
+
1 , bI , G, θ), then a is called a relaxed plan for
(A, bI , G, θ).
4. Following the Conformant-FF terminology, by “leafs” we refer to the nodes having zero in-degree.
5. Note here that it would be possible to do a full SAT check, without any 2-projection (without relying on Imp), to see
whether q becomes known at t. However, as indicated above, doing such a full check for every unknown proposition
at every level of the relaxed planning graph for every search state would very likely be too expensive, computationally.
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In the next two sections we describe the machinery underlying the Probabilistic-FF heuristic
estimation. Due to the similarity between the conceptual relaxations used in Probabilistic-FF and
Conformant-FF, Probabilistic-FF inherits almost all of Conformant-FF’s machinery. Of course,
the new contributions are those algorithms dealing with probabilistic belief states and probabilistic
actions.
4.2 Probabilistic Relaxed Planning Graphs
Like FF and Conformant-FF, Probabilistic-FF computes its heuristic function in two steps, the first
one chaining forward to build a relaxed planning graph, and the second step chaining backward to
extract a relaxed plan. In this section, we describe in detail Probabilistic-FF’s forward chaining step,
building a probabilistic relaxed planning graph (or PRPG, for short). In Section 4.4, we then show
how one can extract a (probabilistic) relaxed plan from the PRPG. We provide a detailed illustration
of the PRPG construction process on the basis of our running example; since the illustration is
lengthy, it is moved to a separate Section 4.3.
The algorithms building a PRPG are quite involved; it is instructive to first consider (some
of) the key points before delving into the details. The main issue is, of course, that we need to
extend Conformant-FF’s machinery with the ability to determine when the goal set is sufficiently
likely, rather than when it is known to be true for sure. To achieve that, we must introduce into
relaxed planning some effective reasoning about both the probabilistic initial state, and the effects
of probabilistic actions. It turns out that such a reasoning can be obtained by a certain weighted
extension of the implication graph. In a nutshell, if we want to determine how likely it is that a fact
q is true at a time t, then we propagate certain weights backwards through the implication graph,
starting in q(t); the weight of q(t) is set to 1, and the weight for any p(t′) gives an estimate of the
probability of achieving q at t given that p holds at t′. Computing this probability exactly would,
of course, be too expensive. Our estimation is based on assuming independence of the various
probabilistic events involved. This is a choice that we made very carefully; we experimented widely
with various other options before deciding in favor of this technique.
Any simplifying assumption in the weight propagation constitutes, of course, another relaxation,
on top of the relaxations we already inherited from Conformant-FF. The particularly problematic
aspect of assuming independence is that it is not an under-estimating technique. The actual weight
of a node p(t′) – the probability of achieving q at t given that p holds at t′ – may be lower than our
estimate. In effect, the PRPG may decide wrongly that a relaxed plan exists: even if we execute
all relaxed actions contained in the successful PRPG, the probability of achieving the goal by this
execution may be less than the required threshold. In other words, we lose the soundness (relative
to relaxed tasks) of the relaxed planning process.
We experimented with an alternative weight propagation method, based on an opposite assump-
tion, that the relevant probabilistic events always co-occur, and that hence the weights must be
propagated according to simple maximization operations. This propagation method yielded very
uninformative heuristic values, and hence inacceptable empirical behaviour of Probabilistic-FF,
even in very simple benchmarks. In our view, it seems unlikely that an under-estimating yet in-
formative and efficient weight computation exists. We further experimented with some alternative
non under-estimating propagation schemes, in particular one based on assuming that the probabilis-
tic events are completely disjoint (and hence weights should be added); these schemes gave better
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performance than maximization, but lagged far behind the independence assumption in the more
challenging benchmarks.
Let us now get into the actual algorithm building a PRPG. A coarse outline of the algorithm is as
follows. The PRPG is built in a layer-wise fashion, in each iteration extending the PRPG, reaching
up to time t, by another layer, reaching up to time t+1. The actions in the new step are those whose
preconditions are known to hold at t. Effects conditioned on unknown facts (note here the reduction
of effect conditions to a single fact) constitute new edges in the implication graph. In difference to
Conformant-FF, we don’t obtain a single edge from condition to add effect; instead, we obtain edges
from the condition to “chance nodes”, where each chance node represents a probabilistic outcome of
the effect; the chance nodes, in turn, are linked by edges to their respective add effects. The weights
of the chance nodes are set to the probabilities of the respective outcomes, the weights of all other
nodes are set to 1. These weights are “static weights” which are not “dynamically” modified by
weight propagation; rather, the static weights form an input to the propagation.
Once all implication graph edges are inserted at a layer, the algorithm checks whether any new
facts become known. This check is done very much like the corresponding check in Conformant-FF,
by testing whether the disjunction of the support leafs for a proposition p at t+ 1 is implied by the
initial state formula. The two differences to Conformant-FF are: (1) Only leafs are relevant whose
dynamic weight is 1 (otherwise, achieving a leaf is not guaranteed to accomplish p at t + 1). (2)
Another reason for p to become known may be that all outcomes of an unconditional effect (or an
effect with known condition) result in achievement of p at time t + 1. We elegantly formulate the
overall test by a single implication test over support leafs whose dynamic weight equals their own
weight.
Like FF’s and Conformant-FF’s algorithms, the PRPG process has two termination criteria. The
PRPG terminates positively if the goal probability is high enough at time t; the PRPG terminates
negatively if, from t to t + 1, nothing has changed that may result in a higher goal propability at
some future t′. The goal probability in a layer t is computed based on weighted model counting over
a formula derived from the support leafs of all goals not known to be true. The criteria for negative
termination check: whether any new facts have become known or unknown (not negatively known);
whether any possibly relevant new support leafs have appeared; and whether the goal probability
has increased. If neither is the case, then we can stop safely—if the PRPG terminates unsuccessfully
then we have a guarantee that there is no relaxed plan, and that the corresponding belief is hence a
dead end.
Let us get into the details. Figure 4 depicts the main routine for building the PRPG for a belief
state ba. As we already specified, the sets P (t), uP (t), and A(t) contain the propositions that are
known to hold at time t (hold at t with probability 1), the propositions that are unknown to hold at
time t (hold at t with probability less than 1 but greater than 0), and actions that are known to be
applicable at time t, respectively. The layers t ≥ 0 of PRPG capture applying the relaxed actions
starting from ba. The layers−m to−1 of PRPG correspond to the m-step action sequence a leading
from the initial belief state to the belief state in question ba. We inherit the latter technique from
Conformant-FF; in a sense, the PRPG “reasons about the past”. This may look confusing at first
sight, but it has a simple reason. Imagine the PRPG starts at level 0 instead. Then, to check whether
a proposition becomes known, we have to do SAT tests regarding support leafs against the belief
state formula, φ(ba), instead of the initial state formula (similarly for weighted model counting
to test whether the goal is likely enough). Testing against φ(ba) is possible, but very expensive
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procedure build-PRPG(a,A, φ(NbI ), G, θ, |+1 ),
returns a Bool saying if there is a relaxed plan for the belief state
given by a = 〈a−m, . . . , a−1〉, and
builds data structures from which a relaxed plan can be extracted
Φ := φ(NbI ), Imp := ∅
P (−m) := {p | p is known in Φ}, uP (−m) := {p | p is unknown in Φ}
for t := −m · · · − 1 do
A(t) := {at|+1 } ∪NOOPS
build-timestep(t, A(t))
endfor
t := 0
while get-P(t, G) < θ do
A(t) := {a|+1 | a ∈ A, pre(a) ⊆ P (t)} ∪NOOPS
build-timestep(t, A(t))
if P (t+ 1) = P (t) and
uP (t+ 1) = uP (t) and
∀p ∈ uP (t+ 1) : uP (−m) ∩ support(p(t+ 1)) = uP (−m) ∩ support(p(t)) and
get-P(t+ 1, G) = get-P(t, G) then
return FALSE
endif
t := t+ 1
endwhile
T := t, return TRUE
Figure 4: Main routine for building a probabilistic relaxed planning graph (PRPG).
computationally.6 The negative-index layers chain the implication graph all the way back to the
initial state, and hence enable us to perform SAT tests against the – typically much smaller – initial
state formula.
Returning to Figure 4, the PRPG is initialized with an empty implication set Imp, P (−m)
and uP (−m) are assigned the propositions that are known and unknown in the initial belief state,
and a weighted CNF formula Φ is initialized with φ(NbI ). Φ is the formula against which implica-
tion/weighted model checking tests are run when asking whether a proposition becomes known/whether
the goal is likely enough. While the PRPG is built, Φ is incrementally extended with further clauses
to capture the behavior of different effect outcomes.
The for loop builds the sets P and uP for the a’s time steps −m · · · − 1 by iterative invocation
of the build-timestep procedure that each time expands PRPG by a single time level. At each
iteration −m ≤ t ≤ −1, the sets P (t + 1) and uP (t + 1) are made to contain the propositions
that are known/unknown after applying the relaxed version of the action at ∈ a (remember that
a = 〈a1, . . . , am〉). To simplify the presentation, each action set A(t) contains a set of dummy
actions NOOPS that simply transport all the propositions from time layer t to time layer t+1. More
formally, NOOPS =
{
noopp | p ∈ P
}
, where pre(noopp) = ∅, E(noopp) = {({p}, {ε})}, and
ε = (1.0, {p}, ∅)}).
6. In Conformant-FF, this configuration is implemented as an option; it significantly slows down the search in most
domains, and brings advantages only in a few cases.
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The subsequent while loop constructs the relaxed planning graph from layer 0 onwards by,
again, iterative invocation of the build-timestep procedure. The actions in each layer t ≥ 0 are
relaxations of those actions whose preconditions are known to hold at time t with certainty. This
iterative construction is controlled by two termination tests. First, if the goal is estimated to hold at
layer t with probability higher than θ, then we know that a relaxed plan estimate can be extracted.
Otherwise, if the graph reaches a fix point, then we know that no relaxed (and thus, no real) plan
from bI exists. We postpone the discussion of these two termination criteria, and now focus on the
time layer construction procedure build-timestep.
procedure build-timestep(t, A),
builds P (t+ 1), uP (t+ 1), and the implication edges from t to t+ 1,
as induced by the action set A
P (t+ 1) := P (t), uP (t+ 1) := ∅
for all effects e of an action a ∈ A, con(e) ∈ P (t) ∪ uP (t) do
for all ε ∈ Λ(e) do
uP (t+ 1) := uP (t+ 1) ∪ add(ε)
introduce new fact ε(t) with ̟(ε(t)) = Pr(ε)
Imp := Imp ∪ {(ε(t), p(t+ 1)) | p ∈ add(ε)}
endfor
if con(e) ∈ uP (t) then
Imp := Imp ∪
⋃
ε∈Λ(e){(con(e)(t), ε(t))}
else
Φ := Φ ∧
(
∨ε∈Λ(e)ε(t)
)
∧
∧
ε,ε′∈Λ(e) (¬ε(t) ∨ ¬ε
′(t))
endif
endfor
for all p ∈ uP (t+ 1) do
build-w-impleafs(p(t+ 1), Imp)
support(p(t+ 1)) := {l | l ∈ leafs(Imp→p(t+1)) ∧̟p(t+1)(l) = ̟(l)}
if Φ→
∨
l∈support(p(t+1)) l then P (t+ 1) := P (t+ 1) ∪ {p} endif
endfor
uP (t+ 1) := uP (t+ 1) \ P (t+ 1)
Figure 5: Building a time step of the PRPG.
The build-timestep procedure is shown in Figure 5. The first for loop of build-timestep proceeds
over all outcomes of (relaxed) actions in the given set A that may occur at time t. For each such
probabilistic outcome we introduce a new chance proposition weighted by the conditional likelihood
of that outcome.7 Having that, we extend Imp with binary implications from this new chance
proposition to the add list of the outcome. If we are uncertain about the condition con(e) of the
corresponding effect at time t, that is, we have con(e) ∈ uP (t), then we also add implications
from con(e) to the chance propositions created for the outcomes of e. Otherwise, if con(e) is
known at time t, then there is no uncertainty about our ability to make the effect e to hold at time
t. In this case, we do not “ground” the chance propositions created for the outcomes of e into the
implication graph, but simply extend the running formula Φ with clauses capturing the “exactly
one” relationship between these chance propositions corresponding to the alternative outcomes of e
7. Of course, in our implementation we have a special case treatment for deterministic actions, using no chance nodes
(rather than a single “chance node” with static weight 1).
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at time t. This way, the probabilistic uncertainty about the outcome of e can be treated as if being a
property of the initial belief state bI ; This is the only type of knowledge we add into the knowledge
base formula Φ after initializing it in build-PRPG to φ(NbI ).
Notation Description
Impv→u The graph containing exactly all the paths from node v to node u in Imp.
Imp→u The subgraph of Imp formed by node u and all the ancestors of u in Imp.
leafs(Imp′) The set of all zero in-degree nodes in the subgraph Imp′ of Imp.
E(Imp′) The set of time-stamped action effects responsible for the implication edges
of the subgraph Imp′ of Imp.
Table 2: Overview of notations around the implication graph.
The second for loop checks whether a proposition p, unknown at time t, becomes known at
time t+ 1. This part of the build-timestep procedure is somewhat more involved; Table 2 provides
an overview of the main notations used in the follows when discussing the various uses of the
implication graph Imp.
First thing in the second for loop of build-timestep, a call to build-w-impleafs procedure asso-
ciates each node v(t′) in Imp→p(t+1) with an estimate ̟p(t+1)(v(t′)) on the probability of achieving
p at time t + 1 by the effects E(Impv(t′)→p(t+1)), given that v holds at time t′. In other words, the
dynamic weight (according to p(t+1)) of the implication graph nodes is computed. Note that v(t′)
can be either a time-stamped proposition q(t′) for some q ∈ P, or a chance proposition ε(t′) for
some probabilistic outcome ε.
We will discuss the build-w-impleafs procedure in detail below. For proceeding to understand
the second for loop of build-timestep, the main thing we need to know is the following lemma:
Lemma 4 Given a node v(t′) ∈ Imp→p(t+1), we have ̟p(t+1) (v(t′)) = ̟ (v(t′)) if and only if,
given v at time t′, the sequence of effects E(Impv(t′)→p(t+1)) achieves p at t+ 1 with probability 1.
In words, v(t′) leads to p(t + 1) with certainty iff the dynamic weight of v(t′) equals its static
weight. This is a simple consequence of how the weight propagation is arranged; it should hold true
for any reasonable weight propagation scheme (“do not mark a node as certain if it is not”). A full
proof of the lemma appears in Appendix A on pp. 613.
Re-consider the second for loop of build-timestep. What happens is the following. Having
finished the build-w-impleafs weight propagation for p at time t+ 1, we
1. collect all the leafs support(p(t+ 1)) of Imp→p(t) that meet the criteria of Lemma 4, and
2. check (by a call to a SAT solver) whether the knowledge-base formula Φ implies the disjunc-
tion of these leafs.
If the implication holds, then the examined fact p at time t is added to the set of facts known at time
t. Finally, the procedure removes from the set of facts that are known to possibly hold at time t+ 1
all those facts that were just proven to hold at time t+ 1 with certainty.
To understand the above, consider the following. With Lemma 4, support(p(t + 1)) contains
exactly the set of leafs achieving which will lead to p(t+1) with certainty. Hence we can basically
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procedure build-w-impleafs (p(t), Imp)
top-down propagation of weights ̟p(t) from p(t) to all nodes in Imp→p(t)
̟p(t) (p(t)) := 1
for decreasing time steps t′ := (t− 1) . . . (−m) do
for all chance nodes ε(t′) ∈ Imp→p(t) do
α :=
∏
r∈add(ε),r(t′+1)∈Imp
→p(t)
[
1−̟p(t) (r(t
′ + 1))
]
̟p(t) (ε(t
′)) := ̟ (ε(t′)) · (1− α)
endfor
for all fact nodes q(t′) ∈ Imp→p(t) do
α := 1
for all a ∈ A(t′), e ∈ E(a), con(e) = q do
α := α ·
[
1−
∑
ε∈Λ(e),ε(t′)∈Imp
→p(t)
̟p(t) (ε(t
′))
]
endfor
̟p(t) (q(t
′)) := 1− α
endfor
endfor
Figure 6: The build-w-impleafs procedure for weight back-propagation over the implication graph.
use the same implication test as in Conformant-FF. Note, however, that the word “basically” in the
previous sentence hides a subtle but important detail. In difference to the situation in Conformant-
FF, support(p(t + 1)) may contain two kinds of nodes: (1) proposition nodes at the start layer of
the PRPG, i.e., at layer −m corresponding to the initial belief; (2) chance nodes at later layers of
the PRPG, corresponding to outcomes of effects that have no unknown conditions. This is the point
where the discussed above updates on the formula Φ are needed—those keep track of alternative
effect outcomes. Hence testing Φ →
∨
l∈support(p(t+1)) l is the same as testing whether either: (1) p
is known at t+1 because it is always triggered with certainty by at least one proposition true in the
initial world; or (2) p is known at t+ 1 because it is triggered by all outcomes of an effect that will
appear with certainty. We get the following result:
Lemma 5 Let (A,NbI , G, θ) be a probabilistic planning task, a be a sequence of actions applicable
in bI , and |+1 be a relaxation function for A. For each time step t ≥ −m, and each proposition p ∈
P, if P (t) is constructed by build-PRPG(a,A, φ(NbI ), G, θ, |+1 ), then p at time t can be achieved
by a relaxed plan starting with a|+1
(1) with probability > 0 (that is, p is not negatively known at time t) if and only if p ∈ uP (t)∪P (t),
and
(2) with probability 1 (that is, p is known at time t) if and only if p ∈ P (t).
This is a consequence of the arguments outlined above. The full proof of Lemma 5 is given in
Appendix A on pp. 614.
Let us now consider the weight-propagating8 procedure build-w-impleafs depicted in Figure 6.
This procedure performs a layered, top-down weight propagation from a given node9 p(t) ∈ Imp
8. The weight propagation scheme of the build-w-impleafs procedure is similar in nature to this used in the heuristics
module of the recent probabilistic temporal planner Prottle of Little, Aberdeen, and Thie´baux (2005).
9. Note that the “t” here will be instantiated with t+ 1 when called from build-timestep.
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down to the leafs of Imp→p(t). This order of traversal ensures that each node of Imp→p(t) is pro-
cessed only after all its successors in Imp→p(t). For the chance nodes ε(t′), the dynamic weight
̟p(t) (ε(t
′)) is set to
1. the probability that the outcome ε takes place at time t′ given that the corresponding action
effect e(ε) does take place at t′, times
2. an estimate of the probability of achieving p at time t by the effects E(Impε(t′)→p(t)).
The first quantity is given by the “global”, static weight ̟ (ε(t′)) assigned to ε(t′) in the first for
loop of build-timestep. The second quantity is derived from the dynamic weights ̟p(t) (r(t′ + 1))
for r ∈ add(ε), computed in the previous iteration of the outermost for loop of build-w-impleafs.
Making a heuristic assumption that the effect sets E(Impr(t′+1)→p(t)) for different r ∈ add(ε) are
all pairwise independent, α is then set to the probability of failure to achieve p at t by the effects
E(Impε(t′)→p(t)). This computation of α for ε(t′) is decomposed over the artifacts of ε, and this
is where the weight propagation starts taking place. For the fact nodes q(t′), the dynamic weight
̟p(t) (q(t
′)) is set to the probability that some action effect conditioned on q at time t′ allows
(possibly indirectly) achieving the desired fact p at time t. Making again the heuristic assumption
of independence between various such effects conditioned on q at t′, computing ̟p(t) (q(t′)) is
decomposed over the outcomes of these effects.
procedure get-P (t,G)
estimates the probability of achieving G at time p.
if G 6⊆ P (t) ∪ uP (t) then return 0 endif
if G ⊆ P (t) then return 1 endif
for g ∈ G \ P (t) do
for each l ∈ leafs(Imp→g(t)), introduce a chance proposition 〈lg〉 with weight ̟g(t) (l)
ϕg := (
∨
l∈leafs(Imp
→g(t))
l) ∧
∧
l∈leafs(Imp
→g(t))∩uP (−m)
(¬l ∨ 〈lg〉)
endfor
return WMC(Φ ∧
∧
g∈G\P (t) ϕg)
Figure 7: Estimating the goal likelihood at a given time step.
What remains to be explained of the build-PRPG procedure are the two termination criteria of
the while loop constructing the planning graph from the layer 0 onwards. The first test is made by
a call to the get-P procedure, and it checks whether the PRPG built to the time layer T contains
a relaxed plan for (A,NbI , G, θ). The get-P procedure is shown in Figure 7. First, if one of the
subgoals is negatively known at time t, then, from Lemma 5, the overall probability of achieving
the goal is 0. On the other extreme, if all the subgoals are known at time t, then the probability of
achieving the goal is 1. The correctness of the latter test is implied by Lemma 5 and non-interference
of relaxed actions. This leaves us with the main case in which we are uncertain about some of the
subgoals. This uncertainty is either due to dependence of these subgoals on the actual initial world
state, or due to achieving these subgoals using probabilistic actions, or due to both. The uncertainty
about the initial state is fully captured by our weighted CNF formula φ(NbI ) ⊆ Φ. Likewise, the
outcomes’ chance propositions ε(t′) introduced into the implication graph by the build-timestep
procedure are “chained up” in Imp to the propositions on the add lists of these outcomes, and
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“chained down” in Imp to the unknown (relaxed) conditions of these outcomes, if any. Therefore,
if some action outcome ε at time t′ < t is relevant to achieving a subgoal g ∈ G at time t, then
the corresponding node ε(t′) must appear in Imp→g(t), and its weight will be back-propagated by
build-w-impleafs(g(t), Imp) down to the leafs of Imp→g(t). The get-P procedure then exploits
these back-propagated estimates by, again, taking a heuristic assumption of independence between
achieving different subgoals. Namely, the probability of achieving the unknown sub-goals G\P (t)
is estimated by weighted model counting over the formula Φ, conjoined with probabilistic theories
ϕg of achieving each unknown goal g in isolation. To understand the formulas ϕg, consider that, in
order to make g true at t, we must achieve at least one of the leafs l of Imp→g(t); hence the left part of
the conjunction. On the other hand, if we make l true, then this achieves g(t) only with (estimated)
probability ̟g(t) (l); hence the right part of the conjunction requires us to “pay the price” if we set
l to true.10
As was explained at the start of this section, the positive PRPG termination test may fire even if
the real goal probability is not high enough. That is, get-P may return a value higher than the real
goal probability, due to the approximation (independence assumption) done in the weight propaga-
tion. Of course, due to the same approximation, it may also happen that get-P returns a value lower
than the real goal probability.
The second PRPPG termination test comes to check whether we have reached a point in the
construction of PRPG that allows us to conclude that there is no relaxed plan for (A,NbI , G, θ) that
starts with the given action sequence a. This termination criterion asks whether, from time step t
to time step t + 1, any potentially relevant changes have occurred. A potentially relevant change
would be if the goal-satisfaction probability estimate get-P grows, or if the known and unknown
propositions grow, of if the support leafs of the latter propositions in Imp that correspond to the
initial belief state grow.11 If none occurs, then the same would hold in all future iterations t′ > t,
implying that the required goal satisfaction probability θ would never be reached. In other words,
the PRPG construction is complete.
Theorem 6 Let (A,NbI , G, θ) be a probabilistic planning task, a be a sequence of actions appli-
cable in bI , and |+1 be a relaxation function for A. If build-PRPG(a,A, φ(NbI ), G, θ, |+1 ) returns
FALSE, then there is no relaxed plan for (A, bI , G, θ) that starts with a|+1 .
Note that Theorem 6 holds despite the approximation done during weight propagation, making
the assumption of probabilistic independence. For Theorem 6 to hold, the only requirement on the
weight propagation is this: if the real weight still grows, then the estimated weight still grows. This
requirement is met under the independence assumption. It would not be met under the assumption of
co-occurence, propagating weights by maximization operations, and thereby conservatively under-
estimating the weights. With that propagation, if the PRPG fails then we cannot conclude that there
is no plan for the respective belief. This is another good argument (besides the bad quality heuristics
we observed empirically) against using the conservative estimation.
10. If we do not introduce the extra chance propositions 〈lg〉, and instead assign the weight ̟g(t) (l) to l itself, then the
outcome is not correct: we have to “pay” also for setting l to false.
11. To understand the latter, note that PRPG can always be added with more and more replicas of probabilistic actions
irrelevant to achieving the goals, and having effects with known conditions. While these action effects (since they are
irrelevant) will not influence our estimate of goal-satisfaction probability, the chance propositions corresponding to
the outcomes of these effects may become the support leafs of some unknown proposition p. In the latter case, the
set of support leafs support(p(t′)) will infinitely grow with t′ → ∞, while the projection of support(p(t′)) on the
initial belief state (that is, support(p(t)) ∩ uP (t)) is guaranteed to reach a fix point.
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The full proof to Theorem 6 is given in Appendix A on pp. 615. The theorem finalizes our
presentation and analysis of the process of constructing probabilistic relaxed planning graphs.
4.3 Example: PRPG Construction
To illustrate the construction of a PRPG by the algorithm in Figures 4-7, let us consider a simplifi-
cation of our running Examples 1-2 in which
(i) only the actions {move-b-right,move-left} constitute the action set A,
(ii) the goal is G = {r1, b2}, and the required lower bound on the probability of success θ = 0.9,
(iii) the initial belief state bI is given by the BN NbI as in Example 2, and
(iv) the belief state ba evaluated by the heuristic function corresponds to the actions sequence
a = 〈move-b-right〉.
The effects/outcomes of the actions A considered in the construction of PRPG are described in
Table 3, where embr is a re-notation of the effect e in Table 1, the effect e′ in Table 1 is effectively
ignored due to the emptiness of its add effects.
a E(a) con(e) con(e)|+1 Λ(e) Pr(ε) add(ε)
εmbr1 0.7 {r2, b2}
ambr (move-b-right) embr {r1, b1} {r1} εmbr2 0.2 {r2}
εmbr3 0.1 ∅
aml (move-left) eml {r2} {r2} ε
ml 1.0 {r1}
noopr1 e
r1 {r1} {r1} ε
r1 1.0 {r1}
noopr2 e
r2 {r2} {r2} ε
r2 1.0 {r2}
noopb1 e
b1 {b1} {b1} ε
b1 1.0 {b1}
noopb2 e
b2 {b2} {b2} ε
b2 1.0 {b2}
Table 3: Actions and their |+1 relaxation for the PRPG construction example.
The initialization phase of the build-PRPG procedure results in Φ = φ(NbI ), Imp := ∅,
P (−1) = ∅, and uP (−1) = {r1, r2, b1, b2}. The content of uP (−1) is depicted in the first column
of nodes in Figure 8. The first for loop of build-PRPG (constructing PRPG for the “past” layers
corresponding to a) makes a single iteration, and calls the build-timestep procedure with t = −1
and A(-1) = {ambr} ∪NOOPS. (In what follows, using the names of the actions we refer to their
|+1 relaxations as given in Table 3.) The add list of the outcome εmbr3 is empty, and thus it adds no
nodes to the implication graph. Other than that, the chance nodes introduced to Imp by this call to
build-timestep appear in the second column of Figure 8. The first outer for loop of build-timestep
results in Imp given by columns 1-3 of Figure 8, uP (0) = uP (−1), and no extension of Φ.
In the second outer for loop of build-timestep, the weight propagating procedure build-w-impleafs
is called for each unknown fact p(0) ∈ uP (0) = {r1(0), r2(0), b1(0), b2(0)}, generating the “p(0)-
oriented” weights as in Table 4. For each p(0) ∈ uP (0), the set of supporting leafs support(p(0)) =
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Figure 8: The implication graph Imp. The odd columns of nodes depict the sets of unknown propo-
sitions uP (t). The even columns of nodes depict the change propositions introduced for
the probabilistic outcomes of the actions A(t).
{p(−1)}, none of them is implied by Φ = NbI , and thus the set of known facts P (0) remains equal
to P (−1) = ∅, and uP (−1) equal to = uP (−1).
t′ = 0 t′ = −1
r1 r2 b1 b2 ε
mbr
1 ε
mbr
2 ε
r1 εr2 εb1 εb2 r1 r2 b1 b2
̟r1(0) 1 1 1
̟r2(0) 1 0.7 0.2 1 0.9 1
̟b1(0) 1 1 1
̟b2(0) 1 0.7 1 0.7 1
Table 4: The columns in the table correspond to the nodes in the implication graph Imp, and each
row provides the weights ̟p(0) for some p(0) ∈ uP (0). An entry in the row of p(0) is
empty if and only if the node associated with the corresponding column does not belong
to the implication subgraph Imp→p(0).
Having finished with the for loop, the build-PRPG procedure proceeds with the while loop that
builds the “future” layers of PRPG. The test of goal (un)satisficing get-P(0, G) < θ evaluates to
TRUE as we get get-P(0, G) = 0.63 < 0.9, and thus the loop proceeds with its first iteration.
To see the former, consider the implication graph Imp constructed so far (columns 1-3 in Fig-
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ure 8). For our goal G = {r1, b2} we have leafs(Imp→r1(0)) = {r1(−1)}, and leafs(Imp→b2(0)) =
{r1(−1), b2(−1)}. As {r1(0), b2(0)} ⊂ uP (0) and Φ = φ(NbI ), we have
get-P(0, G) = WMC (φ(NbI ) ∧ ϕr1 ∧ ϕb2) ,
where
ϕr1 = (〈r1,r1〉) ∧ (r1 ↔ 〈r1,r1〉) ,
ϕb2 = (〈r1,b2〉 ∨ 〈b2,b2〉) ∧ (r1(−1)↔ 〈r1,b2〉) ∧ (b2(−1)↔ 〈b2,b2〉) ,
(20)
and
̟ (〈r1,r1〉) = ̟r1(0) (r1(−1)) = 1
̟ (〈b2,b2〉) = ̟b2(0) (b2(−1)) = 1 .
̟ (〈r1,b2〉) = ̟b2(0) (r1(−1)) = 0.7
(21)
Observe that the two models of φ(NbI ) consistent with r2 immediately falsify the sub-formula
φ(NbI ) ∧ ϕr1 . Hence, we have
get-P(0, G) = WMC
(
φ(NbI ) ∧ ϕr1 ∧ ϕb2 |r1(−1)=1,b1(−1)=1
)
+
WMC
(
φ(NbI ) ∧ ϕr1 ∧ ϕb2 |r1(−1)=1,b2(−1)=1
)
= bI(r1, b1) ·̟ (〈r1,r1〉) ·̟ (〈r1,b2〉) + bI(r1, b2) ·̟ (〈r1,r1〉) ·̟ (〈r1,b2〉) ·̟ (〈b2,b2〉)
= 0.63 · 1 · 0.7 + 0.27 · 1 · 0.7 · 1
= 0.63
In the first iteration of the while loop, build-PRPG calls the build-timestep procedure with
t = 0 and A(0) = {ambr, aml} ∪ NOOPS. The chance nodes introduced to Imp by this call to
build-timestep appear in the forth column of Figure 8. The first outer for loop of build-timestep
results in Imp given by columns 1-5 of Figure 8, uP (1) = uP (0), and no extension of Φ. As
before, in the second for loop of build-timestep, the build-w-impleafs procedure is called for each
unknown fact p(1) ∈ uP (1) = {r1(1), r2(1), b1(1), b2(1)}, generating the “p(1)-oriented” weights.
The interesting case here is the case of weight propagation build-w-impleafs(r1(1), Imp), resulting
in weights
̟r1(1)(r1(1)) = 1
̟r1(1)(ε
ml(0)) = 1
̟r1(1)(ε
r1(0)) = 1
̟r1(1)(r1(0)) = 1
̟r1(1)(r2(0)) = 1
⇒
̟r1(1)(ε
r1(-1)) = 1
̟r1(1)(ε
r2(-1)) = 1
̟r1(1)(ε
mbr
1 (-1)) = 0.7
̟r1(1)(ε
mbr
2 (-1)) = 0.2
⇒ ̟r1(1)(r1(-1)) = 1
̟r1(1)(r2(-1)) = 1
for the nodes in Imp→r1(1). From that, the set of supporting leafs of r1(1) is assigned to support(r1(1)) =
{r1(−1), r2(−1)}, and since Φ = φ(NbI ) does implies r1(−1) ∨ r2(−1), the fact r1 is concluded
to be known at time 1, and is added to P (1). For all other nodes p(1) ∈ uP (1) we still have
support(p(1)) = {p(−1)}, and thus they all remain unknown at time t = 1 as well. Putting
things together, this call to the build-w-impleafs procedure results with P (1) = {r1(1)}, and
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uP (1) = {r2(1), b1(1), b2(1)}. The while loop of the build-PRPG procedure proceeds with check-
ing the fixpoint termination test, and this immediately fails due to P (1) 6= P (0). Hence, the while
loop proceeds with the next iteration corresponding to t = 1.
The test of goal (un)satisficing get-P(1, G) < θ still evaluates to TRUE because we have
get-P(1, G) = 0.899 < 0.9. Let us follow this evaluation of get-P(1, G) in detail as well. Consid-
ering the implication graph Imp constructed so far up to time t = 1 (columns 1-5 in Figure 8), and
having G ∩ uP (1) = {b2(1)}, leafs(Imp→b2(1)) = {r1(−1), b2(−1)}, and (still) Φ = φ(NbI ), we
obtain
get-P(1, G) = WMC (φ(NbI ) ∧ ϕb2) ,
with
ϕb2 = (〈r1,b2〉 ∨ 〈b2,b2〉) ∧ (r1(−1)↔ 〈r1,b2〉) ∧ (b2(−1)↔ 〈b2,b2〉) , (22)
While the structure of ϕb2 in Equation 22 is identical to this in Equation 20, the weights associated
with the auxiliary chance propositions are different, notably
̟ (〈b2,b2〉) = ̟b2(1) (b2(−1)) = 1 .
̟ (〈r1,b2〉) = ̟b2(1) (r1(−1)) = 0.91
(23)
The difference in ̟ (〈r1,b2〉) between Equation 21 and Equation 23 stems from the fact that r1(−1)
supports b2(1) not only via the effect embr at time −1 but also via the a different instance of the
same effect at time 0. Now, the only model of φ(NbI ) that falsify ϕb2 is the one that sets both r1
and b2 to false. Hence, we have
get-P(1, G) = bI(r1, b1) ·̟ (〈r1,b2〉) +
bI(r1, b2) ·̟ (〈r1,b2〉) ·̟ (〈b2,b2〉) +
bI(r2, b2) ·̟ (〈b2,b2〉)
= 0.63 · 0.91 + 0.27 · 0.91 · 1 + 0.08 · 1
= 0.899
Having verified get-P(1, G) < θ, the while loop proceeds with the construction for time t = 2,
and calls the build-timestep procedure with t = 1 and A(1) = {ambr, aml}∪NOOPS. The chance
nodes introduced to Imp by this call to build-timestep appear in the sixth column of Figure 8. The
first outer for loop of build-timestep results in Imp given by columns 1-7 of Figure 8, and
Φ = φ(NbI ) ∧
(
εmbr1 (1) ∨ ε
mbr
2 (1) ∨ ε
mbr
3 (1)
)
∧
∧
(
¬εmbr1 (1) ∨ ¬ε
mbr
2 (1)
)
∧
(
¬εmbr1 (1) ∨ ¬ε
mbr
3 (1)
)
∧
(
¬εmbr2 (0) ∨ ¬ε
mbr
3 (0)
)
(24)
Next, the build-w-impleafs procedure is called as usual for each unknown fact p(2) ∈ uP (2) =
{r2(2), b1(2), b2(2)}. The information worth detailing here is that now we have leafs(Imp→b2(2)) =
{b2(−1), r1(−1), ε
mbr
1 (1)}, and support(b2(2)) = {b2(−1), εmbr1 (1)}. However, we still have Φ→∨
l∈support(p(2)) l for no p(2) ∈ uP (2), and thus the set of known facts P (2) remains equal to
P (1) = {r1}.
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Returning from the call to the build-w-impleafs procedure, build-PRPG proceeds with checking
the fixpoint termination condition. This time, the first three equalities of the condition do hold, yet
the condition is not satisfied due to get-P(2, G) > get-P(t,G). To see the latter, notice that we have
get-P(2, G) = WMC (Φ ∧ ϕb2) ,
where Φ is given by Equation 24,
ϕb2 =
(
〈r1,b2〉 ∨ 〈b2,b2〉 ∨ ε
mbr
1 (1)
)
∧ (r1(−1) ↔ 〈r1,b2〉) ∧ (b2(−1) ↔ 〈b2,b2〉) , (25)
and
̟ (〈b2,b2〉) = ̟b2(1) (b2(−1)) = 1 .
̟ (〈r1,b2〉) = ̟b2(1) (r1(−1)) = 0.91
̟(εmbr1 (1)) = ̟b2(1)(ε
mbr
1 (1)) = 0.7
(26)
It is not hard to verify that
get-P(2, G) = get-P(1, G) + bI(r2, b1) ·̟(ε
mbr
1 (1))
= 0.899 + 0.02 · 0.7
= 0.913
Note that now we do have get-P(2, G) ≥ θ, and therefore build-PRPG aborts the while loop by
passing the goal satisficing test, and sets T = 2. This finalizes the construction of PRPG, and thus,
our example.
4.4 Extracting a Probabilistic Relaxed Plan
If the construction of the PRPG succeeds in reaching the goals with the estimated probability of suc-
cess get-P(T,G) exceeding θ, then we extract a relaxed plan consisting of A′ ⊆ A(0), . . . , A(T −
1), and use the size of A′ as the heuristic value of the evaluated belief state ba.
Before we get into the technical details, consider that there are some key differences between
relaxed (no delete lists) probabilistic planning on the one hand, and both relaxed classical and re-
laxed qualitative conformant planning on the other hand. In relaxed probabilistic planning, it might
make sense to execute the same action numerous times in consecutive time steps. In fact, this
might be essential – just think of throwing a dice in a game until a “6” appears. In contrast, in the
relaxed classical and qualitatively uncertain settings this is not needed – once an effect has been
executed, it remains true forever. Another complication in probabilistic planning is that the required
goal-achievement probability is specified over a conjunction (or, possibly, some more complicated
logical combination) of different facts. While increasing the probability of achieving each individ-
ual sub-goal g ∈ G in relaxed planning will always increase the overall probability of achieving G,
choosing the right distribution of effort among the sub-goals to pass the required threshold θ for the
whole goal G is a non-trivial problem.
A fundamental problem is the aforementioned lack of guarantees of the weight propagation.
On the one hand, the construction of PRPG and Lemma 5 imply that a|+1 concatenated with an
arbitrary linearization aR of A(0), . . . , A(T − 1) is executable in bI . On the other hand, due to
the independence assumption made in the build-w-impleafs procedure, get-P(T,G) ≥ θ does not
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imply that the probability of achieving G by a|+1 concatenated with aR exceeds θ. A “real” relaxed
plan, in that sense, might not even exist in the constructed PRPG.
Our answer to the above difficulties is to extract relaxed plans that are correct relative to the
weight propagation. Namely, we use an implication graph “reduction” algorithm that computes
a minimal subset of that graph which still – according to the weight propagation – sufficiently
supports the goal. The relaxed plan then corresponds to that subset. Obviously, this “solves” the
difficulty with the lack of “real” relaxed plans; we just do the relaxed plan extraction according to
the independence assumption (besides ignoring deletes and removing all but one condition of each
effect). The mechanism also naturally takes care of the need to apply the same action several times:
this corresponds to several implication graph edges which are all needed in order to obtain sufficient
weight. The choice of how effort is distributed among sub-goals is circumvented in the sense that
all sub-goals are considered in conjunction, that is, the reduction is performed once and for all. Of
course, there remains a choice in which parts of the implication graph should be removed. We have
found that it is a useful heuristic to make this choice based on which actions have already been
applied on the path to the belief. We will detail this below.
Making another assumption on top of the previous relaxations can of course be bad for heuristic
quality. The “relaxed plans” we extract are not guaranteed to actually achieve the desired goal prob-
ability. Since the relaxed plans are used only for search guidance, per se this theoretical weakness is
only of marginal importance. However, an over-estimation of goal probability might result in a bad
heuristic because the relaxed plan does not include the right actions, or does not apply them often
enough. In Section 5, we will discuss an example domain where Probabilistic-FF fails to scale for
precisely this reason.
Figure 9 shows the main routine extract-PRPlan for extracting a relaxed plan from a given
PRPG (note that T is the index of the highest PRPG layer, c.f. Figure 4). The sub-routines of
extract-PRPlan are shown in Figures 10-11. At a high level, the extract-PRPlan procedure consists
of two parts:
1. Reduction of the implication graph, aiming at identifying a set of time-stamped action effects
that can be ignored without decreasing our estimate of goal-achievement probability get-P(T,G)
below the desired threshold θ, and
2. Extraction of a valid relaxed plan ar such that (schematically) constructing PRPG with ar instead
of the full set of A(0), . . . , A(T ) would still result in get-P(T,G) ≥ θ.
The first part is accomplished by the reduce-implication-graph procedure, depicted in Figure 10.
As of the first step in the algorithm, the procedure considers only the parts of the implication graph
that are relevant to achieving the unknown sub-goals. Next, reduce-implication-graph performs a
greedy iterative elimination of actions from the “future” layers 0, . . . , T−1 of PRPG until the proba-
bility estimate get-P(T,G) over the reduced set of actions goes below θ. While, in principle, any ac-
tion from A(0), . . . , A(T−1) can be considered for elimination, in reduce-implication-graph we ex-
amine only repetitions of the actions that already appear in a. Specifically, reduce-implication-graph
iterates over the actions a in a|+1 , and if a repeats somewhere in the “future” layers of PRPG, then
one such repetition a(t′) is considered for removal. If removing this repetition of a is found safe
with respect to achieving θ,12 then it is effectively removed by eliminating all the edges in Imp that
are induced by a(t′). Then the procedure considers the next repetition of a. If removing another
12. Note here that the formula for WMC is constructed exactly as for the get-P function, c.f. Figure 7.
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procedure extract-PRPlan(PRPG(a,A, φ(NbI ), G, θ, |+1 )),
selects actions from A(0), . . . , A(T − 1)
Imp′ := reduce-implication-graph()
extract-subplan(Imp′)
sub-goal(G ∩ P (T ))
for decreasing time steps t := T, . . . , 1 do
for all g ∈ G(t) do
if ∃a ∈ A(t− 1), e ∈ E(a), con(e) ∈ P (t− 1), ∀ε ∈ Λ(e) : g ∈ add(ε) then
add-to-relaxed-plan one such a at time t
sub-goal(pre(a) ∪ con(e))
else
Imp g(t) := construct-support-graph(support(g(t)))
extract-subplan(Imp g(t))
endif
endfor
endfor
Figure 9: Extracting a probabilistic relaxed plan.
copy of a is not safe anymore, then the procedure breaks the inner loop and considers the next
action.
procedure reduce-implication-graph()
operates on the PRPG;
returns a sub-graph of Imp.
Imp′ := ∪g∈G\P (T )Imp→g(T )
for all actions a ∈ a|+1 do
for all edges (ε(t′), p(t′ + 1)) ∈ Imp′′, induced by a(t′) ∈ A(t′), for some t′ ≥ 0 do
Imp′′ := Imp′
remove from Imp′′ all the edges induced by a ∈ A(t′)
for all g ∈ G \ P (t) do
for each l ∈ leafs(Imp′′→g(T )), introduce a chance proposition 〈lg〉 with weight ̟g(T ) (l)
ϕg := (
∨
l∈leafs(Imp′′
→g(T ))
l) ∧
∧
l∈leafs(Imp′′
→g(T ))∩uP (−m)
(¬l ∨ 〈lg〉)
endfor
if WMC(Φ ∧
∧
g∈G\P (T ) ϕg) ≥ θ then Imp
′ := Imp′′ else break endif
endfor
endfor
return Imp′
Figure 10: The procedure reducing the implication graph.
To illustrate the intuition behind our focus on the repetitions of the actions from a, let us con-
sider the following example of a simple logistics-style planning problem with probabilistic actions.
Suppose we have two locations A and B, a truck that is known to be initially in A, and a heavy and
uneasy to grab package that is known to be initially on the truck. The goal is to have the package
unloaded in B with a reasonably high probability, and there are two actions we can use – moving
the truck from A to B (am), and unloading the package (au). Moving the truck does not necessarily
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move the truck to B, but it does that with an extremely high probability. On the other hand, unload-
ing the bothersome package succeeds with an extremely low probability, leaving the package on the
truck otherwise. Given this data, consider the belief state ba corresponding to “after trying to move
the truck once”, that is, to the action sequence 〈am〉. To achieve the desired probability of success,
the PRPG will have to be expanded to a very large time horizon T , allowing the action au to be
applied sufficiently many times. However, the fact “truck in B” is not known in the belief state ba,
and thus the implication graph will also contain the same amount of applications of am. Trimming
away most of these applications of am will still keep the probability sufficiently high.
The reader might ask at this point what we hope to achieve by “trimming away most of the
applications of am”. The point is, intuitively, that the implication graph reduction mechanism is
a means to understand what has been accomplished already, on the path to ba. Without such an
understanding, the relaxed planning can be quite indiscriminative between search states. Consider
the above example, and assume we have not one but two troubled packages, P1 and P2, on the
truck, with unload actions au1 and au2. The PRPG for ba contains copies of au1 and au2 at layers up
to the large horizon T . Now, say our search starts to unload P1. In the resulting belief, the PRPG
still has T steps because the situation has not changed for P2. Each step of the PRPG still contains
copies of both au1 and au2 – and hence the heuristic value remains the same as before! In other
words, without an implication graph reduction technique, relevant things that are accomplished
may remain hidden behind other things that have not yet been accomplished. In the above example,
this is not really critical because, as soon as we have tried an unload for each of P1 and P2, the
time horizon T decreases by one step, and the heuristic value is reduced. It is, however, often
the case that some sub-task must be accomplished before some other sub-task can be attacked. In
such situations, without implication graph reduction, the search staggers across a huge plateau until
the first task is completed. We observed this in a variety of benchmarks, and hence designed the
implication graph reduction to make the relaxed planning aware of what has already been done.
Of course, since our weight propagation may over-estimate true probabilities, and hence over-
estimate what was achieved in the past, the implication graph reduction may conclude prematurely
that a sub-task has been “completed”. This leads us to the main open question in this research; we
will get back to this at the end of Section 5, where we discuss this in the context of an example
where Probabilistic-FF’s performance is bad.
Let us get back to explaining the extract-PRPlan procedure. After the implication graph reduc-
tion, the procedure proceeds with the relaxed plan extraction. The process makes use of proposition
sets G(1), . . . , G(T ), which are used to store time-stamped sub-goals arising at layers 1 ≤ t ≤ T
during the relaxed plan extraction. The sub-routine extract-subplan (Figure 11)
1. adds to the constructed relaxed plan all the time-stamped actions responsible for the edges of the
reduced implication graph Imp′, and
2. subgoals everything outside the implication graph that condition the applicability of the effects
responsible for the edges of Imp′.
Here and in the later phases of the process, the sub-goals are added into the sets G(1), . . . , G(T ) by
the sub-goal procedure that simply inserts each given proposition as a sub-goal at the first layer of
its appearance in the PRPG. Having accomplished this extract-and-subgoal pass of extract-subplan
over Imp′, we also subgoal all the goal conjuncts known at time T .
In the next phase of the process, the sub-goals are considered layer by layer in decreasing order
of time steps T ≥ t ≥ 1. For each sub-goal g at time t, certain supporting actions are selected into
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procedure extract-subplan(Imp′)
actions that are helpful for achieving uncertain goals G ∩ uP (T ) and
subgoals all the essential conditions of these actions
for each edge (ε(t), p(t+ 1)) ∈ Imp′ such that t ≥ 0 do
if action a and its effect e ∈ E(a) be responsible for ε at time t time
add-to-relaxed-plan a at time t
sub-goal((pre(a) ∪ con(e)) ∩ P (t))
endif endfor
procedure sub-goal(P )
inserts the propositions in P as sub-goals
at the layers of their first appearance in the PRPG
for all p ∈ P do
t0 := argmint {p ∈ P (t)}
if t0 ≥ 1 then G(t0) := G(t0) ∪ {p} endif
endfor
procedure construct-support-graph(support(g(t)))
takes a subset support(g(t)) of leafs(Imp→g(t)) weighted according to g(t);
returns a sub-graph Imp′ of Imp.
Imp′ := ∅
open := support(g(t))
while open 6= ∅ do
open := open \ {p(t′)}
choose a ∈ A(t′), e ∈ E(a), con(e) = {p} such that
∀ε ∈ Λ(e) : (p(t′), ε(t′)) ∈ Impg(t) ∧̟g(t)(ε(t′)) = ̟(ε(t′))
for each ε ∈ Λ(e) do
choose q ∈ add(ε) such that ̟g(t)(q(t′ + 1)) = 1
Imp′ := Imp′ ∪ {(p(t′), ε(t′)), (ε(t′), q(t′ + 1))}
open := open ∪ {q(t′ + 1)}
endfor endwhile
return Imp′
Figure 11: Sub-routines for extract-PRPlan.
the relaxed plan. If there is an action a and some effect e ∈ E(a) that are known to be applicable
at time t − 1, and guarantee to achieve g with certainty, then a is added to the constructed relaxed
plan at t− 1. Otherwise, we
1. use the construct-support-graph procedure to extract a sub-graph Imp g(t) consisting of a set of
implications that together ensure achieving g at time t, and
2. use the already discussed procedure extract-subplan to
(a) add to the constructed relaxed plan all the time-stamped actions responsible for the edges
of Imp g(t), and
(b) subgoal everything outside this implication graph Imp g(t) that condition the applicability
of the effects responsible for the edges of Imp g(t).
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Processing this way all the sub-goals down to G(1) finalizes the extraction of the relaxed plan
estimate. Section 4.5 provides a detailed illustration of this process on the PRPG constructed in
Section 4.3. In any event, it is easy to verify that the relaxed plan we extract is sound relative to our
weight propagation, in the following sense.
Proposition 7 Let (A,NbI , G, θ) be a probabilistic planning task, a be a sequence of actions ap-
plicable in bI , and |+1 be a relaxation function for A such that build-PRPG(a,A, φ(NbI ), G, θ, |+1 )
returns TRUE. Let A(0)s, . . . , A(T − 1)s be the actions selected from A(0), . . . , A(T − 1) by
extract-PRPlan. When constructing a relaxed planning graph using only A(0)s, . . . , A(T − 1)s,
then get-P(T,G) ≥ θ.
Proof: By construction: reduce-implication-graph leaves enough edges in the graph so that the
weight propagation underlying get-P still concludes that the goal probability is high enough.
4.5 Example: Extracting a Relaxed Plan from PRPG
We illustrate the process of the relaxed plan extraction on the PRPG as in Figure 8, constructed for
the belief state and problem specification as in example in Section 4.3. In this example we have
T = 2, G ∩ uP (2) = {b2}, and thus the implication graph Imp gets immediately reduced to its
sub-graph Imp′ depicted in Figure 12a. As the plan a to the belief state in question consists of only a
single action ambr, the only action instances that are considered for elimination by the outer for loop
of reduce-implication-graph are ambr(0) and ambr(1). If ambr(0) is chosen to be examined, then the
implication sub-graph Imp′′ = Imp′ is further reduced by removing all the edges due to ambr(0),
and the resulting Imp′′ appears13 in Figure 12b. The Φ and ϕb2 components of the evaluated formula
Φ ∧ ϕb2 are given by Equation 24 and Equation 25, respectively, and the weights associated with
the chance propositions in Equation 25 over the reduced implication graph Imp′′ are
̟ (〈b2,b2〉) = ̟b2(1) (b2(−1)) = 1
̟ (〈r1,b2〉) = ̟b2(1) (r1(−1)) = 0.7 .
̟(εmbr1 (1)) = ̟b2(1)(ε
mbr
1 (1)) = 0.7
(27)
The weight model counting of Φ∧ϕb2 evaluates to 0.724 < θ, and thus Imp′′ does not replace Imp′.
The only alternative action removal is this of ambr(1), and it can be seen from the example in Sec-
tion 4.3 that this attempt for action elimination will also result in probability estimate lower than θ.
Hence, the only effect of reduce-implication-graph on the PRPG processed by the extract-PRPlan
procedure is the reduction of the implication graph to only the edges relevant to achieving {b2} at
time T = 2. The reduced implication sub-graph Imp′ returned by the reduce-implication-graph
procedure is depicted in Figure 12a.
Next, the extract-subplan procedure iterates over the edges of Imp′ and adds to the initially
empty relaxed plan applications of ambr at times 0 and 1. The action ambr has no preconditions,
and the condition r1 of the effect εmbr1 ∈ E(ambr) is known at time 1. Hence, extract-subplan
invokes the sub-goal procedure on {r(1)}, and the latter is added into the proposition set G(1). The
subsequent call sub-goal(G∩P (T )) = sub-goal({r1}) leads to no further extensions of G(2), G(1)
13. The dashed edges in Figure 12b can be removed from Imp′′ either now or at a latter stage if Imp′′ is chosen to replace
Imp′.
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  εmbr1 (-1) ]\
 !
//
  εmbr1 (0) ]\
 !
//
  εmbr1 (1) ]\
 !
//
r1(-1)
88qqqqqqqqq
//
  εr1(-1) // r1(0)
88rrrrrrrr
b2(-1) //
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Figure 12: Illustrations for various steps of the relaxed plan extraction from the PRPG constructed
in Section 4.3, and, in particular, from the implication graph of the latter, depicted in
Figure 8.
as we already have r1 ∈ G(1). Hence, the outer for loop of extract-PRPlan starts with G(2) = ∅,
and G(1) = {r1}.
Since G(2) is empty, the first sub-goal considered by extract-PRPlanis r1 from G(1). For r1
at time 1, no action effect at time 0 passes the test of the if statement—the condition r2 of εml
is not known at time 0, and the same is true14 for εr1 . Hence, the subgoal r1(1) is processed
by extracting a sub-plan to support achieving it with certainty. First, the construct-support-graph
procedure is called with support(r1(1)) = {r1(−1), r2(−1)} (see Section 4.3). The extracted sub-
14. In fact, it is easy to see from the construction of the sub-goal procedure that if p belongs to G(t), then the condition
of the noop’s effect εp cannot be known at time t− 1.
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graph Imp r1(1) of the original implication graph Imp is depicted in Figure 12c, and invoking the
procedure extract-subplan on Imp r1(1) results in adding (i) application of aml at time 0, and (ii)
no new subgoals. Hence, the proposition sets G(1), G(2) get emptied, and thus we end up with
extracting a relaxed plan 〈ambr(0), aml(0), ambr(1)〉.
5. Empirical Evaluation
We have implemented Probabilistic-FF in C, starting from the Conformant-FF code. With θ = 1.0,
Probabilistic-FF behaves exactly like Conformant-FF (except that Conformant-FF cannot handle
non-deterministic effects). Otherwise, Probabilistic-FF behaves as described in the previous sec-
tions, and uses Cachet (Sang et al., 2005) for the weighted model counting. To better home in on
strengths and weaknesses of our approach, the empirical evaluation of Probabilistic-FF has been
done in two steps. In Section 5.1 we evaluate Probabilistic-FF on problems having non-trivial un-
certain initial states, but only deterministic actions. In Section 5.2 we examine Probabilistic-FF
on problems with probabilistic action effects, and with both sources of uncertainty. We compare
Probabilistic-FF’s performance to that of the probabilistic planner POND (Bryce et al., 2006). The
reasons for choosing POND as the reference point are twofold. First, similarly to Probabilistic-FF,
POND constitutes a forward-search planner guided by a non-admissible heuristic function based
on (relaxed) planning graph computations. Second, to our knowledge, POND clearly is the most
efficient probabilistic planner reported in the literature.15
The experiments were run on a PC running at 3GHz with 2GB main memory and 2MB cache
running Linux. Unless stated otherwise, each domain/problem pair was tried at four levels of de-
sired probability of success θ ∈ {0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1.0}. Each run of a planner was time-limited by
1800 seconds of user time. Probabilistic-FF was run in the default configuration inherited from FF,
performing one trial of enforced hill-climbing and switching to best-first search in case of failure. In
domains without probabilistic effects, we found that Probabilistic-FF’s simpler relaxed plan extrac-
tion developed for that case (Domshlak & Hoffmann, 2006), performs better than the one described
in here. We hence switch to the simpler version in these domains.16
Unlike Probabilistic-FF, the heuristic computation in POND has an element of randomization;
namely, the probability of goal achievement is estimated via sending a set of random particles
through the relaxed planning graph (the number of particles is an input parameter). For each prob-
lem instance, we averaged the runtime performance of POND over 10 independent runs. In special
cases where POND timed out on some runs for a certain problem instance, yet not on all of the
10 runs, the average we report for POND uses the lower-bounding time threshold of 1800s to re-
place the missing time points. In some cases, POND’s best-case performance differs a lot from
its average performance; in these cases, the best-case performance is also reported. We note that,
following the suggestion of Dan Bryce, POND was run in its default parameter setting, and, in par-
15. In our experiments we have used a recent version 2.1 of POND that significantly enhances POND2.0 (Bryce et al.,
2006). The authors would like to thank Dan Bryce and Rao Kambhampati for providing us with a binary distribution
of POND2.1.
16. Without probabilistic effects, relaxed plan extraction proceeds very much like in Conformant-FF, with an additional
straightforward backchaining selecting support for the unknown goals. The more complicated techniques developed
in here to deal with relaxed plan extraction under probabilistic effects appear to have a more unstable behavior than
the simpler techniques. If there are probabilistic effects, then the simple backchaining is not meaningful because it
has no information on how many times an action must be applied in order to sufficiently support the goal.
600
PROBABILISTIC-FF
θ = 0.25 θ = 0.5 θ = 0.75 θ = 1.0
Instance #actions/#facts/#states t/|S|/l t/|S|/l t/|S|/l t/|S|/l
Safe-uni-70 70/71/140 1.39/19 /18 4.02/36/35 8.06/54/53 4.62/71 /70
Safe-cub-70 70/70/138 0.28/6/5 0.76/13/12 1.54/22/21 4.32/70/69
Cube-uni-15 6/90/3375 3.25/145/26 3.94/150/34 5.00/169/38 25.71/296/42
Cube-cub-15 6/90/3375 0.56/41/8 1.16/70/13 1.95/109/18 26.35/365/42
Bomb-50-50 2550/200/> 2100 0.01/1/0 0.10/17/16 0.25/37/36 0.14/51/50
Bomb-50-10 510/120/> 260 0.00/1/0 0.89/248/22 4.04/778/62 1.74/911/90
Bomb-50-5 255/110/> 255 0.00/1/0 1.70/468/27 4.80/998/67 2.17/1131/95
Bomb-50-1 51/102/> 251 0.00/1/0 2.12/662/31 6.19/1192/71 2.58/1325/99
Log-2 3440/1040/> 2010 0.90/117/54 1.07/152/62 1.69/205/69 1.84/295/78
Log-3 3690/1260 /> 3010 2.85/159/64 8.80/328/98 4.60/336/99 4.14/364/105
Log-4 3960/1480/> 4010 2.46/138/75 8.77/391/81 6.20/377/95 8.26/554/107
Grid-2 2040/825 /> 3610 0.07/39/21 1.35/221/48 6.11/1207/69 6.14/1207/69
Grid-3 2040/841 /> 3610 16.01/1629/76 15.8/1119/89 82.24/3974/123 66.26/3974/123
Grid-4 2040/857 /> 3610 28.15/2167/96 51.58/2541/111 50.80/2541/115 193.47/6341/155
Rovers-7 393/97 /> 63 ∗ 38 0.01/ 37/18 0.01/ 37/18 0.01/ 37/18 0.01/ 37/18
RoversP-7 393/133 /> 63 ∗ 38 2.15/942/65 2.23/983/75 2.37/1008/83 2.29/1008/83
RoversPP-7 393/133 /> 63 ∗ 38 8.21/948/65 12.48/989/75 12.53/994/77 16.20/1014/83
RoversPPP-7 395/140 /> 63 ∗ 38 25.77/950/67 41.18/996/79 0.01/UNSAT 0.01/UNSAT
Table 5: Empirical results for problems with probabilistic initial states. Times t in seconds, search
space size |S| (number of calls to the heuristic function), plan length l.
ticular, this includes the number of random particles (64) selected for computing POND’s heuristic
estimate (Bryce et al., 2006).
5.1 Initial State Uncertainty and Deterministic Actions
We now examine the performance of Probabilistic-FF and POND in a collection of domains with
probabilistic initial states, but with deterministic action effects. We will consider the domains one
by one, discussing for each a set of runtime plots. For some of the problem instances, Table 5 shows
more details, providing features of the instance size as well as detailed results for Probabilistic-FF,
including the number of explored search states and the plan length.
Our first three domains are probabilistic versions of traditional conformant benchmarks: “Safe”,
“Cube”, and “Bomb”. In Safe, out of n combinations one opens the safe. We are given a probability
distribution over which combination is the right one. The only type of action in Safe is trying a
combination, and the objective is to open the safe with probability ≥ θ. We experimented with
two probability distributions over the n combinations, a uniform one (“Safe-uni”) and a distribution
that declines according to a cubic function (“Safe-cub”). Table 5 shows that Probabilistic-FF can
solve this very efficiently even with n = 70. Figure 13 compares between Probabilistic-FF and
POND, plotting their time performance on an identical linear scale, where x-axes show the number
of combinations.
From the graphs it is easy to see that Probabilistic-FF outperforms POND by at least an order of
magnitude on both Safe-uni and Safe-cub. But a more interesting observation here is not necessarily
the difference in time performance, but the relative performance of each planner on Safe-uni and
Safe-cub. Note that Safe-cub is somewhat “easier” than Safe-uni in the sense that, in Safe-cub, fewer
combinations must be tried to guarantee a given probability θ of opening the safe. This because the
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Figure 13: The Safe domain, Probabilistic-FF (left) vs. POND (right).
dominant part of the probability mass lies on the combinations at the head of the cubic distribution
(the last combination has probability 0 to be the right combination, and thus it needs not be tried
even when θ = 1.0). The question is now whether the heuristic functions of Probabilistic-FF and
POND exploit this difference between Safe-uni and Safe-cub. Table 5 and Figure 13 provide an
affirmative answer for this question for the heuristic function of Probabilistic-FF. The picture with
POND was less clear as the times spent by POND on (otherwise identical) instances of Safe-uni and
Safe-cub were roughly the same.17
Another interesting observation is that, for both Probabilistic-FF and POND, moving from θ =
1.0 to θ < 1.0, that is, from planning with qualitative uncertainty to truly probabilistic planning,
17. On Safe-cub with n = 70 and θ ∈ {0.75, 1.0}, POND undergoes an exponential blow-up that is not shown in the
graphs since these data points would obscure the other data points; anyway, we believe that this blow-up is due only
to some unfortunate troubles with numerics.
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Figure 14: The Cube domain, Probabilistic-FF (left) vs. POND (right).
typically did not result in a performance decline. We even get improved performance (except for
θ = 0.75 in Safe-uni). The reason seems to be that the plans become shorter. This trend can be
observed also in most other domains. The trend is particularly remarkable for Probabilistic-FF, since
moving from θ = 1.0 to θ < 1.0 means to move from a case where no model counting is needed
to a case where it is needed. (In other words, Probabilistic-FF automatically “specializes” itself for
the qualitative uncertainty, by not using the model counting. To our knowledge, the same is not true
of POND, which uses the same techniques in both cases.)
In Cube, the task is to move into a corner of a 3-dimensional grid, and the actions correspond
to moving from the current cube cell to one of the (up to 6) adjacent cube cells. Again, we created
problem instances with uniform and cubic distributions (over the initial position in each dimension),
and again, Probabilistic-FF scales well, easily solving instances on a 15 × 15 × 15 cube. Within
our time limit, POND was capable of solving Cube problems with cube width ≤ 13. Figure 14
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compares between Probabilistic-FF and POND in more detail, plotting their time performance on
different linear scales (with x-axes capturing the width of the grid in each dimension), and showing
at least an order of magnitude advantage for Probabilistic-FF. Note that,
• Probabilistic-FF generally becomes faster with decreasing θ (with decreasing hardness of
achieving the objective), while θ does not seem to have a substantial effect on the performance
of POND,
• Probabilistic-FF exploits the relative easiness of Cube-cub (e.g., see Table 5), while the time
performance of POND on Cube-cub and Cube-uni is qualitatively identical.
We also tried a version of Cube where the task is to move into the grid center. Probabilistic-FF is
bad at doing so, reaching its performance limit at n = 7. This weakness in the Cube-center domain
is inherited from Conformant-FF. As detailed by Hoffmann and Brafman (2006), the reason for the
weakness lies in the inaccuracy of the heuristic function in this domain. There are two sources of
this inaccuracy. First, to solve Cube-center in reality, one must start with moving into a corner in
order to establish her position; in the relaxation, without delete lists, this is not necessary. Second,
the relaxed planning graph computation over-approximates not only what can be achieved in future
steps, but also what has already been achieved on the path to the considered belief state. For even
moderately long paths of actions, the relaxed planning graph comes to the (wrong) conclusion that
the goal has already been achieved, so the relaxed plan becomes empty and there is no heuristic
information.
Next we consider the famous Bomb-in-the-Toilet domain (or Bomb, for short). Our version
of Bomb contains n bombs and m toilets, where each bomb may be armed or not armed indepen-
dently with probability 1/n, resulting in huge numbers of initially possible world states. Dunking a
bomb into an unclogged toilet disarms the bomb, but clogs the toilet. A toilet can be unclogged by
flushing it. Table 5 shows that Probabilistic-FF scales nicely to n = 50, and becomes faster as m
increases. The latter is logical and desirable as having more toilets means having more “disarming
devices”, resulting in shorter plans needed. Figures 15 and 16 compare between Probabilistic-FF
and POND, plotting the time performance of Probabilistic-FF on a linear scale, and that of POND
on a logarithmic scale. The four pairs of graphs correspond to four choices of number of toilets
m ∈ {50, 10, 5, 1}. The x-axes in all these graphs correspond to the number of potentially armed
bombs, where we checked problems with n ∈ {5, 10, 25, 50}. Figure 15 shows that this time
Probabilistic-FF is at least four orders of magnitude faster than POND; At the extremes, while the
hardest combination of n = 50, m = 1, and θ = 0.75 took Probabilistic-FF less than 7 seconds,
POND timed-out on most of the problem instances. In addition,
• In Bomb as well, Probabilistic-FF exhibit the nice pattern of improved performance as we
move from non-probabilistic (θ = 1.0) to probabilistic planning (specifically, θ ≤ 0.5; for
θ ≤ 0.25, the initial state is good enough already).
• While the performance of Probabilistic-FF improves with the number of toilets, POND seems
to exhibit the inverse dependence, that is, being more sensitive to the number of states in the
problem (see Table 5) rather to the optimal solution depth.
Finally, we remark that, though length-optimality is not explicitly required in probabilistic confor-
mant planning, for all of Safe, Cube, and Bomb, Probabilistic-FF’s plans are optimal (the shortest
possible).
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Figure 15: The Bomb domain, Probabilistic-FF (left) vs. POND (right).
Our next three domains are adaptations of benchmarks from deterministic planning: “Logistics”,
“Grid”, and “Rovers”. We assume that the reader is familiar with these domains. Each Logistics-x
instance contains 10 cities, 10 airplanes, and 10 packages, where each city has x locations. The
packages are with chance 0.88 at the airport of their origin city, and uniformly at any of the other
locations in that city. The effects of all loading and unloading actions are conditional on the (right)
position of the package. Note that higher values of x increase not only the space of world states, but
also the initial uncertainty. Grid is the complex grid world run in the AIPS’98 planning competi-
tion (McDermott, 1998), featuring locked positions that must be opened with matching keys. Each
Grid-x here is a modification of instance nr. 2 (of 5) run at AIPS’98, with a 6 × 6 grid, 8 locked
positions, and 10 keys of which 3 must be transported to a goal position. Each lock has x possi-
ble, uniformly distributed shapes, and each of the 3 goal keys has x possible, uniformly distributed
initial positions. The effects of pickup-key, putdown-key, and open-lock actions are conditional.
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Figure 16: The Bomb domain, Probabilistic-FF (left) vs. POND (right).
Finally, our last set of problems comes from three cascading modifications of instance nr. 7 (of
20) of the Rovers domain used at the AIPS’02 planning competition. This problem instance has 6
waypoints, 3 rovers, 2 objectives, and 6 rock/soil samples. From Rovers to RoversPPP we modify
the instance/domain as follows.
• Rovers is the original AIPS’02 problem instance nr. 7, and we use it hear mainly for compar-
ison.
• In RoversP, each sample is with chance 0.8 at its original waypoint, and with chance 0.1
at each of the others two waypoints. Each objective may be visible from 3 waypoints with
uniform distribution (this is a probabilistic adaptation of the domain suggested by Bryce &
Kambhampati, 2004).
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Figure 17: Probabilistic-FF and POND on problems from (a) Sand-Castle, and (b) Slippery-
Gripper.
• RoversPP enhances RoversP by conditional probabilities in the initial state, stating that whether
or not an objective is visible from a waypoint depends on whether or not a rock sample (intu-
ition: a large piece of rock) is located at the waypoint. The probability of visibility is much
higher if the latter is not the case. Specifically, the visibility of each objective depends on the
locations of two rock samples, and if a rock sample is present, then the visibility probability
drops to 0.1.
• RoversPPP extends RoversPP by introducing the need to collect data about water existence.
Each of the soil samples has a certain probability (< 1) to be “wet”. For communicated
sample data, an additional operator tests whether the sample was wet. If so, a fact “know-
that-water” contained in the goal is set to true. The probability of being wet depends on the
location of the sample.
We show no runtime plots for Logistics, Grid, and Rovers, since POND runs out of either time or
memory on all considered instances of these domains. Table 5 shows that the scaling behavior of
Probabilistic-FF in these three domains is similar to that observed in the previous domains. The
goals in the RoversPPP problem cannot be achieved with probabilities θ ∈ {0.75, 1.0}. This is
proved by Probabilistic-FF’s heuristic function, providing the correct answer in split seconds.
5.2 Probabilistic Actions
Our first two domains with probabilistic actions are the famous “Sand-Castle” (Majercik & Littman,
1998) and “Slippery-Gripper” (Kushmerick et al., 1995) domains. The domains are simple, but they
posed the first challenges for probabilistic planners; our performance in these domains serves an
indicator of the progress relative to previous ideas for probabilistic planning.
In Sand-Castle, the states are specified by two boolean variables moat and castle, and state
transitions are given by two actions dig-moat and erect-castle. The goal is to erect the castle.
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Figure 18: Probabilistic-FF and POND on problems from (a) 1D-WalkGrid with θ = 0.9, and (b)
2D-WalkGrid with θ = 0.01.
Building a moat with dig-moat might fail with probability 0.5. Erecting a castle with erect-castle
succeeds with probability 0.67 if the moat has already been built, and with probability 0.25, other-
wise. If failed, erect-castle also destroys the moat with probability 0.5. Figure 17(a) shows that
both Probabilistic-FF and POND solve this problem in less than a second for arbitrary high values
of θ, with the performance of both planners being almost independent of the required probability of
success.
Slippery-Gripper is already a bit more complicated domain. The states in Slippery-Gripper
are specified by four boolean variables grip-dry, grip-dirty, block-painted, and block-held, and
there are four actions dry, clean, paint, and pickup. In the initial state, the block is neither painted
nor held, the gripper is clean, and the gripper is dry with probability 0.7. The goal is to have a
clean gripper holding a painted block. Action dry dries the gripper with probability 0.8. Action
clean cleans the gripper with probability 0.85. Action paint paints the block with probability 1,
but makes the gripper dirty with probability 1 if the block was held, and with probability 0.1 if it
was not. Action pickup picks up the block with probability 0.95 if the gripper is dry, and with
probability 0.5 if the gripper is wet.
Figure 17(b) depicts (on a log-scale) the relative performance of Probabilistic-FF and POND
on Slippery-Gripper as a function of growing θ. The performance of Probabilistic-FF is nicely flat
around 0.06 seconds. This time, the comparison with POND was somewhat problematic, because,
for any fixed θ, POND on Slippery-Gripper exhibited a huge variance in runtime. In Figure 17(b)
we plot the best runtimes for POND, as well as its average runtimes. The best run-times for POND
for different values of θ vary around a couple of seconds, but the average runtimes are significantly
worse. (For some high values of θ POND timed-out on some sample runs, and thus the plot provides
a lower bound on the average runtimes.)
In the next two domains, “1D-WalkGrid” and “2D-WalkGrid”, the robot has to pre-plan a se-
quence of conditional movements taking it from a corner of the grid to the farthest (from the initial
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position) corner (Hyafil & Bacchus, 2004). In 1D-WalkGrid the grid is one-dimensional, while
in 2D-WalkGrid the grid is two-dimensional. Figure 18(a) depicts (on a log-scale) a snapshot of
the relative performance of Probabilistic-FF and POND on one-dimensional grids of width n and
θ = 0.9. The robot is initially at (1, 1), should get to (1, n), and it can try moving in each of the two
possible directions. Each of the two movement actions moves the robot in the right direction with
probability 0.8, and keeps it in place with probability 0.2. It is easy to see from Figure 18(a) that the
difference between the two planners in this domain is substantial—while runtime of Probabilistic-
FF grows only linearly with x, the same dependence for POND is seemingly exponential.
The 2D-WalkGrid domain is already much more challenging for probabilistic planning. In all
2D-WalkGrid problems with n × n grids the robot is initially at (1, 1), should get to (n, n), and it
can try moving in each of the four possible directions. Each of the four movement actions advances
the robot in the right direction with probability 0.8, in the opposite direction with probability 0,
and in either of the other two directions with probability 0.1. Figure 18(a) depicts (on a log-scale)
a snapshot of the relative performance of Probabilistic-FF and POND on 2D-WalkGrid with very
low required probability of success θ = 0.01, and this as a function of the grid’s width n. The
plot shows that Probabilistic-FF still scales well with increasing n (though not linearly anymore),
while POND time-outs for all grid widths n > 3. For higher values of θ, however, Probabilistic-FF
does reach the time-out limit on rather small grids, notably n = 6 and n = 5 for θ = 0.25 and
θ = 0.5, respectively. The reason for this is that Probabilistic-FF’s heuristic function is not good
enough at estimating how many times, at an early point in the plan, a probabilistic action must be
applied in order to sufficiently support a high goal threshold at the end of the plan. We explain this
phenomenon in more detail at the end of this section, where we find that it also appears in a variant
of the well-known Logistics domain.
Our last set of problems comes from the standard Logistics domain. Each problem instance
x-y-z contains x locations per city, y cities, and z packages. We will see that Probabilistic-FF
scales much worse, in Logistics, in the presence of probabilistic effects than if there is “only” initial
state uncertainty (we will explain the reason for this at the end of this section). Hence we use much
smaller instances than the ones used above in Section 5.1. Namely, to allow a direct comparison to
previous results in this domain, we closely follow the specification of Hyafil and Bacchus (2004).
We use instances with configurations x-y-z = 2-2-2, 4-2-2, and 2-2-4, and distinguish between two
levels of uncertainty.
• L-x-y-z correspond to problems with uncertainty only in the outcome of the load and unload
actions. Specifically, the probabilities of success for load are 0.875 for trucks and 0.9 for
airplanes, and for unload, 0.75 and 0.8, respectively.
• LL-x-y-z extends L-x-y-z with independent uniform priors for each initial location of a
package within its start city.
Figure 19 depicts (on a log scale) runtimes of Probabilistic-FF and POND on L-2-2-2, L-4-2-2,
and L-2-2-4, as a function of growing θ. On these problems, both planners appear to scale well,
with the runtime of Probabilistic-FF and the optimal runtime of POND being roughly the same,
and the average runtime of POND somewhat degrading from 2-2-2 to 4-2-2 to 2-2-4. This shows
that both planners are much more efficient in this domain than the previously known SAT and CSP
based techniques. However, moving to LL-x-y-z changes the picture for both planners. The results
are as follows:
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Figure 19: Probabilistic-FF and POND on problems from Logistics (a) L-2-2-2, (b) L-4-2-2, and
(c) L-2-2-4.
1. On LL-2-2-2, the runtimes of Probabilistic-FF were identical to those on L-2-2-2, and the
optimal runtimes of POND only slightly degraded to 2−8 seconds. However, for all examined
values of θ, some runs of POND resulted in timeouts.
2. On LL-4-2-2, the runtimes of Probabilistic-FF were identical to those on L-4-2-2 for θ ∈
{0.01, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75}, yet Probabilistic-FF time-outed on θ = 0.95. The optimal runtimes
of POND degraded from those for L-4-2-2 only to 9 − 18 seconds, and again, for all values
of θ, some runs of POND resulted in timeouts.
3. On LL-2-2-4, Probabilistic-FF experienced hard times, finishing in 0.19 seconds for θ =
0.01, and time-outing for all other examined values of θ. The optimal runtimes of POND
degraded from those for L-2-2-4 to 120 − 700 seconds, and here as well, for all values of θ,
some runs of POND resulted in timeouts.
We also tried a variant of LL-x-y-z with non-uniform priors over the initial locations of the pack-
ages, but this resulted in a qualitatively similar picture of absolute and relative performance.
The LL-x-y-z domain remains challenging, and deserves close attention in the future develop-
ments for probabilistic planning. In this context, it is interesting to have a close look at what the
reasons for the failure of Probabilistic-FF is. It turns out that Probabilistic-FF is not good enough
at estimating how many times, at an early point in the plan, a probabilistic action must be applied
in order to sufficiently support a high goal threshold at the end of the plan. To make this concrete,
consider a Logistics example with uncertain effects of all load and unload actions. Consider a pack-
age P that must go from a city A to a city B. Let’s say that P is initially not at A’s airport. If the
goal threshold is high, this means that, to be able to succeed, the package has to be brought to A’s
airport with a high probability before loading it onto an airplane. This is exactly the point where
Probabilistic-FF’s heuristic function fails. The relaxed plan contains too few actions unloading P
at A’s airport. The effect is that the search proceeds too quickly to loading P onto a plane and
bringing it to B. Once the search gets to the point where B should be unloaded to its goal loca-
tion, the goal threshold cannot be achieved no matter how many times one unloads P. At this point,
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Probabilistic-FF’s enforced hill-climbing enters a loop and eventually fails because the relaxed plan
(which over-estimates the past achievements) becomes empty.18
The challenge here is to devise methods that are better at recognizing how many times P has
to be unloaded at A’s airport in order to sufficiently support the goal threshold. The error made by
Probabilistic-FF lies in that our propagation of weights on the implication graph over-estimates the
goal probability. Note here that this is much more critical for actions that must be applied early on
in the plan, than for actions that are applied later. If an action a appears early on in a plan, then
the relaxed plan, when a is executed, will be long. Recall that the weight propagation proceeds
backwards, from the goal towards the current state. At each single backwards step, the propagation
makes an approximation that might lose precision of the results. Over several backwards steps,
these imprecisions accumulate. Hence the quality of the approximation decreases quickly over the
number of backwards steps. The longer the distance between goal and current state is, the more
information is lost. We have observed this phenomenon in detailed experiments with different
weight propagation schemes, that is, with different underlying assumptions. Of the propagation
schemes we tried, the independence assumption, as presented in this paper, was by far the most
accurate one. All other schemes failed to deliver good results even for much shorter distances
between the goal and the current state.
It is interesting to consider how this issue affects POND, which uses a very different method for
estimating the probability of goal achievement: instead of performing a backwards propagation and
aggregation of weight values, POND sends a set of random particles through the relaxed planning
graph in a forward fashion, and stops the graph building if enough particles end up in the goal. From
our empirical results, it seems that this method suffers from similar difficulties as Probabilistic-FF,
but not to such a large extent. POND’s optimal runtimes for LL-x-y-z are much higher than those
for L-x-y-z. This indicates that it is always challenging for POND to “recognize” the need for
applying some action a many times early on in the plan. More interestingly, POND never times-out
in L-x-y-z, but it does often time-out in LL-x-y-z. This indicates that, to some extent, it is a matter
of chance whether or not POND’s random particles recognize the need for applying an action a
many times early on in the plan. An intuitive explanation is that the “good cases” are those where
sufficiently many of the particles failed to reach the goal due to taking the “wrong effect” of a.
Based on this intuition, one would expect that it helps to increase the number of random particles in
POND’s heuristic function. We did so, running POND on LL-x-y-z with an increased number of
particles, 200 and 600 instead of the default value of 64. To our surprise, the qualitative behavior of
POND did not change, time-outing in a similar number of cases. It is unclear to us what the reason
for this phenomenon is. Certainly, it can be observed that the situation encoded in LL-x-y-z is not
solved to satisfaction by either of Probabilistic-FF’s weight propagation or POND’s random particle
methods, in their current configurations.
At the time of writing, it is unclear to the authors how better methods could be devised. It seems
unlikely that a weight propagation – at least one that does not resort to expensive reasoning – exists
which manages long distances better than the independence assumption. An alternative way out
might be to simply define a weaker notion of plans that allows to repeat certain kinds of actions –
18. This does not happen in the above L-2-2-2, L-4-2-2, and L-2-2-4 instances simply because they are too small and a
high goal probability can be achieved without thinking too much about the above problem; if one increases the size
of these instances, the problem appears. The problem appears earlier in the presence of initial state uncertainty – even
in small instances such as LL-2-2-2, LL-4-2-2, and LL-2-2-4 – because with uncertainty about the start position of
the packages one needs to try unloading them at the start airports more often.
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throwing a dice or unloading a package – arbitrarily many times. However, since our assumption is
that we do not have any observability during plan execution, when executing such a plan there would
still arise the question how often an action should be tried. Since Logistics is a fairly well-solved
domain in simpler formalisms – by virtue of Probabilistic-FF, even in the probabilistic setting as
long as the effects are deterministic – we consider addressing this problem as a quite pressing open
question.
6. Conclusion
We developed a probabilistic extension of Conformant-FF’s search space representation, using
a synergetic combination of Conformant-FF’s SAT-based techniques with recent techniques for
weighted model counting. We further provided an extension of conformant relaxed planning with
approximate probabilistic reasoning. The resulting planner scales well on a range of benchmark do-
mains. In particular it outperforms its only close relative, POND, by at least an order of magnitude
in almost all of the cases we tried.
While this point may be somewhat obvious, we would like to emphasize that our achievements
do not solve the (this particular) problem once and for all. Probabilistic-FF inherits strengths and
weaknesses from FF and Conformant-FF, like domains where FF’s or Conformant-FF’s heuristic
functions yield bad estimates (e.g. the mentioned Cube-center variant). What’s more, the proba-
bilistic setting introduces several new potential impediments for FF’s performance. For one thing,
weighted model counting is inherently harder than SAT testing. Though this did not happen in our
set of benchmarks, there are bound to be cases where the cost for exact model counting becomes
prohibitive even in small examples. A promising way to address this issue lies in recent methods
for approximate model counting (Gomes, Sabharwal, & Selman, 2006; Gomes, Hoffmann, Sabhar-
wal, & Selman, 2007). Such methods are much more efficient than exact model counters. They
provide high-confidence lower bounds on the number of models. The lower bounds can be used in
Probabilistic-FF in place of the exact counts. It has been shown that good lower bounds with very
high confidecne can be achieved quickly. The challenge here is to extend the methods – which are
currently designed for non-weighted CNFs – to handle weighted model counting.
More importantly perhaps, in the presence of probabilistic effects there is a fundamental weak-
ness in Probabilistic-FF’s – and POND’s – heuristic information. This becomes a pitfall for perfor-
mance even in a straightforward adaptation of the Logistics domain, which is otherwise very easy
for this kind of planners. As outlined, the key problem is that, to obtain a high enough confidence
of goal achievement, one may have to apply particular actions several times early on in the plan.
Neither Probabilistic-FF’s nor POND’s heuristics are good enough at identifying how many times.
In our view, finding techniques that address this issue is currently the most important open topic in
this area.
Apart from addressing the latter challenge, we intend to work towards applicability in real-word
settings. Particularly, we will look at the space application settings that our Rovers domain hints at,
at medication-type treatment planning domains, and at the power supply restoration domain (Bertoli,
Cimatti, Slaney, & Thie´baux, 2002).
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Appendix A. Proofs
Proposition 2 Let (A,NbI , G, θ) be a probabilistic planning problem described over k state vari-
ables, and a be anm-step sequence of actions fromA. Then, we have |Nba | = O(|NbI |+mα(k+1))
where α is the largest description size of an action in A.
Proof: The proof is rather straightforward, and it exploits the local structure of Nba’s CPTs. The
first nodes/CPTs layer X(0) of Nba constitutes an exact copy of NbI . Then, for each 1 ≤ t ≤ m, the
t-th layer of Nba contains k + 1 node {Y(t)} ∪ X(t).
First, let us consider the “action node” Y(t). While specifying the CPT TY (t) in a straightforward
manner as if prescribed by Eq. 4 might result in an exponential blow up, the same Eq. 4 suggests
that the original description of at is by itself a compact specification of TY (t). Therefore, TY (t)
can be described in space O(α), and this description can be efficiently used for answering queries
TY (t)(Y(i) = ε | π) as in Eq. 4. Next, consider the CPT TX(t) of a state-variable node X(t) ∈ X(t).
This time, it is rather evident from Eq. 5 that TX(t) can be described in space O(α) so that queries
TX(t)(X(t) = x | X(t−1) = x
′) could be efficiently answered. Thus, summing up for all layers
1 ≤ t ≤ m, the description size of |Nba | = O(|NbI |+mα(k + 1))
Lemma 4 Given a node v(t′) ∈ Imp→p(t), we have ̟p(t) (v(t′)) = ̟ (v(t′)) if and only if, given v
at time t′, the sequence of effects E(Impv(t′)→p(t)) achieves p at t with probability 1.
Proof: The proof of Lemma 4 is by a backward induction on the time layers of Impv(t′)→p(t). For
time t, the only node of Imp→p(t) time-stamped with t is p(t) itself. For this node we do have
̟p(t) (p(t)) = ̟ (p(t)) = 1, but, given p at time t, an empty plan corresponding to (empty)
E(Impp(t)→p(t)) trivially “re-establishes” p at t with certainty. Assuming now that the claim holds
for all nodes of Imp→p(t) time stamped with t′ + 1, . . . , t, we now show that it holds for the nodes
time stamped with t′.
It is easy to see that, for any node v(t′) ∈ Imp→p(t), we get ̟p(t) (v(t′)) = ̟ (v(t′)) only if
α goes down to zero. First, consider the chance nodes ε(t′) ∈ Impv→p(t). For such a node, lb is
set to zero if and only if we have ̟p(t) (r(t′ + 1)) = 1 for some r ∈ add(ε). However, by our
inductive assumption, in this and only in this case the effects E(Impε(t′)→p(t+1)) achieve p at t with
probability 1, given the occurrence of ε at time t′.
Now, consider the fact nodes q(t′) ∈ Impv→p(t). For such a node, α can get nullified only by
some effect e ∈ E(a), a ∈ A(t′), con(e) = q. The latter happens if only if, for all possible out-
comes of e, (i) the node ε(t′) belongs to Imp→p(t), and (ii) and the estimate ̟p(t) (ε(t′)) = ̟(ε(t′)).
In other words, by our inductive assumption, given any outcome ε ∈ Λ(e) at time t′, the ef-
fects E(Impε(t′)→p(t)) achieve p at t with probability 1. Thus, given q at time t′, the effects
E(Impq(t′)→p(t)) achieve p at t with probability 1 independently of the actual outcome of e. Al-
ternatively, if for q(t′) we have lb > 0, then for each effect e conditioned on q(t), there exists an
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outcome ε of e such that, according to what we just proved for the chance nodes time-stamped with
t′, the effects E(Impε(t′)→p(t+1)) do not achieve p at t with probability 1. Hence, the whole set of
effects E(Impq(t′)→p(t+1)) does not achieve p at t with probability 1.
Lemma 5 Let (A,NbI , G, θ) be a probabilistic planning task, a be a sequence of actions applicable
in bI , and |+1 be a relaxation function for A. For each time step t ≥ −m, and each proposition p ∈
P, if P (t) is constructed by build-PRPG(a,A, φ(NbI ), G, θ, |+1 ), then p at time t can be achieved
by a relaxed plan starting with a|+1
(1) with probability > 0 (that is, p is not negatively known at time t) if and only if p ∈ uP (t)∪P (t),
and
(2) with probability 1 (that is, p is known at time t) if and only if p ∈ P (t).
Proof: The proof of the “if” direction is by a straightforward induction on t. For t = −m the claim
is immediate by the direct initialization of uP (−m) and P (−m). Assume that, for −m ≤ t′ < t,
if p ∈ uP (t′) ∪ P (t′), then p is not negatively known at time t′, and if p ∈ P (t′), then p is known
at time t′.
First, consider some p(t) ∈ uP (t) ∪ P (t), and suppose that p is egatively know at time t. By
the inductive assumption, and the property of the PRPG construction that uP (t− 1) ∪ P (t− 1) ⊆
uP (t) ∪ P (t), we have p 6∈ uP (t − 1) ∪ P (t − 1). Therefore, p has to be added into uP (t) (and
then, possibly, moved from there to P (t)) in the first for loop of the build-timestep procedure.
However, if so, then there exists an action a ∈ A(t − 1), e ∈ E(a), and ε ∈ Λ(e) such that (i)
con(e) ∈ uP (t− 1)∪P (t− 1), and (ii) p ∈ add(ε). Again, by the assumption of the induction we
have that pre(a) is known at time t−1, and con(e) is not negatively known at time t−1. Hence, the
non-zero probability of ε occurring at time t implies that p can be achieved at time t with probability
greater than 0, contradicting that p is negatively know at time t.
Now, let us consider some p(t) ∈ P (t). Notice that, for t > −m, we have p(t) ∈ P (t) if and
only if
Φ −→
∨
l∈support(p(t))
l . (28)
Thus, for each world state w consistent with bI , we have either q ∈ w for some fact proposition
q(−m) ∈ support(p(t)), or, for some effect e of an action a(t′) ∈ A(t′), t′ < t, we have con(e) ∈
P (t′) and {ε(t′) | ε ∈ Λ(e)} ⊆ support(p(t)). In this first case, Lemma 4 immediately implies that
the concatenation of a|+1 with an arbitrary linearization of the (relaxed) actions A(0), . . . , A(t− 1)
achieves p at t with probability 1, and thus p is known at time t. In the second case, our inductive
assumption implies that con(e) is known at time t, and together with Lemma 4 this again implies that
the concatenation of a|+1 with an arbitrary linearization of the (relaxed) actions A(0), . . . , A(t− 1)
achieves p at t with probability 1.
The proof of the “only if” direction is by induction on t as well. For t = −m this claim is
again immediate by the direct initialization of P (−m). Assume that, for −m ≤ t′ < t, if p is not
negatively known at time t′, then p ∈ uP (t′) ∪ P (t′), and if p is known at time t′, then p ∈ P (t′).
First, suppose that p is not negatively known at time t, and yet we have p 6∈ uP (t) ∪ P (t). From
our inductive assumption plus that A(t − 1) containing all the NOOP actions for propositions in
uP (t− 1) ∪ P (t− 1), we know that p is negatively known at time t− 1. If so, then p can become
not negatively known at time t only due to some ε ∈ Λ(e), e ∈ E(a), such that pre(a) is known
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at time t − 1, and con(e) is not negatively known at time t − 1. By our inductive assumption, the
latter conditions imply con(e) ∈ uP (t − 1) ∪ P (t − 1), and pre(a) ∈ P (t − 1). But if so, then p
has to be added to uP (t)∪P (t) by the first for loop of the build-timestep procedure, contradicting
our assumption that p 6∈ uP (t) ∪ P (t).
Now, let us consider some p known at time t. By our inductive assumption, P (t − 1) contains
all the facts known at time t− 1, and thus A(t− 1) is the maximal subset of actions A|+1 applicable
at time t− 1. Let us begin with an exhaustive classification of the effects e of the actions A(t − 1)
with respect to our p at time t.
(I) ∀ε ∈ Λ(e) : p ∈ add(ε), and con(e) ∈ P (t− 1)
(II) ∀ε ∈ Λ(e) : p ∈ add(ε), and con(e) ∈ uP (t− 1)
(III) ∃ε ∈ Λ(e) : p 6∈ add(ε) or con(e) 6∈ P (t− 1) ∪ uP (t− 1)
If the set (I) is not empty, then, by the construction of build-w-impleafs(p(t), Imp), we have
{ε(t− 1) | ε ∈ Λ(e)} ⊆ support(p(t)),
for each e ∈ (I). Likewise, by the construction of build-timestep (notably, by the update of Φ), for
each e ∈ (I), we have
Φ −→
∨
{ε(t−1)|ε∈Λ(e)}
ε(t− 1).
Putting these two facts together, we have that Eq. 28 holds for p at time t, and thus we have p ∈ P (t).
Now, suppose that the set (I) is empty. It is not hard to verify that no subset of only effects (III)
makes p known at time t. Thus, the event “at least one of the effects (II) occurs” must hold with
probability 1. First, by the construction of build-w-impleafs(p(t), Imp), we have
support (p(t)) ⊇
⋃
e∈(II)
support (con(e)(t− 1))
Then, and 4 from Lemma 4 we have that the event “at least one of the effects (II) occurs” holds with
probability 1 if and only if
Φ −→
∨
e∈(II)
l∈support(con(e)(t−1))
l
Putting these two facts together, we have that Eq. 28 holds for p at time t, and thus we have p ∈ P (t).
Theorem 6 Let (A,NbI , G, θ) be a probabilistic planning task, a be a sequence of actions appli-
cable in bI , and |+1 be a relaxation function for A. If build-PRPG(a,A, φ(NbI ), G, θ, |+1 ) returns
FALSE, then there is no relaxed plan for (A, bI , G, θ) that starts with a|+1 .
Proof: Let t > 0 be the last layer of the PRPG upon the termination of build-PRPG. For every
−m ≤ t′ ≤ t, by the construction of PRPG and Lemma 5, the sets P (t′) and uP (t′) contain all
(and only all) propositions that are known (respectively unknown) after executing all the actions in
the action layers up to and including A(t′ − 1).
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First, let us show that if build-PRPG returns FALSE, then the corresponding termination cri-
terion would hold in all future iterations. If P (t + 1) = P (t), then we have A(t + 1) = A(t).
Subsequently, since P (t + 1) ∪ uP (t + 1) = P (t) ∪ uP (t) and A(t + 1) = A(t), we have
P (t+2)∪uP (t+2) = P (t+1)∪uP (t+1). Given that, we now show that P (t+2) = P (t+1)
and uP (t+ 2) = uP (t+ 1).
Assume to the contrary that there exists p(t+2) ∈ P (t+2) such that p(t+1) 6∈ P (t+1), that
is p(t+1) ∈ uP (t+1). By the construction of the sets P (t+1) and P (t+2) in the build-timestep
procedure, we have
Φ −→
∨
l∈support(p(t+2))
l ,
Φ 6−→
∨
l∈support(p(t+1))
l
(29)
Consider an exhaustive classification of the effects e of the actions A(t+1) with respect to our p at
time t+ 2.
(I) ∀ε ∈ Λ(e) : p ∈ add(ε), and con(e) ∈ P (t+ 1)
(II) ∀ε ∈ Λ(e) : p ∈ add(ε), and con(e) ∈ uP (t+ 1)
(III) ∃ε ∈ Λ(e) : p 6∈ add(ε) or con(e) 6∈ P (t+ 1) ∪ uP (t+ 1)
Suppose that the set (I) is not empty, and let e ∈ (I). From P (t) = P (t+ 1) we have that con(e) ∈
P (t), and thus {ε(t) | ε ∈ Λ(e)} ⊆ support(p(t + 1)). By the update of Φ in build-timestep we
then have Φ −→
∨
{ε(t)|ε∈Λ(e)} ε(t), and thus Φ −→
∨
l∈support(p(t+1)) l, contradicting Eq. 29.
Alternatively, assume that the set (I) is empty. Using the arguments similar to these in the proof
of Lemma 5, p(t+ 2) ∈ P (t+ 2) and p(t+ 1) 6∈ P (t+ 1) in this case imply that
Φ −→
∨
e∈(II)
l∈support(con(e)(t+1))
l
Φ 6−→
∨
e∈(II)
l∈support(con(e)(t))
l
(30)
However, A(t + 1) = A(t), uP (t + 1) = uP (t), and P (t + 1) = P (t) together imply that all
the action effects that can possibly take place at time t + 1 are also feasible to take place at time
t. Therefore, since for each e ∈ (II) we have con(e) ∈ uP (t + 1) by the definition of (II), Eq. 30
implies that⋃
e∈(II)
support (con(e)(t + 1)) ∩ uP (−m) 6=
⋃
e∈(II)
support (con(e)(t)) ∩ uP (−m), (31)
contradicting our termination condition. Hence, we arrived into contradiction with our assumption
that p(t+ 1) 6∈ P (t+ 1).
Having shown that P (t + 2) = P (t + 1) and uP (t + 2) = uP (t + 1), we now show that the
termination criteria implies that, for each q(t+ 2) ∈ uP (t+ 2), we have
uP (−m) ∩ support(p(t+ 2)) = uP (−m) ∩ support(p(t+ 1)).
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Let Ep(t+2) be the set of all effects of actions A(t+1) such that con(e) ∈ uP (t+1), and, for each
outcome ε ∈ Λ(e), we have p ∈ add(ε). Given that, we have
uP (−m) ∩ support(p(t+ 2)) = uP (−m) ∩
⋃
e∈Ep(t+2)
support(con(e)(t + 1))
= uP (−m) ∩
⋃
e∈Ep(t+2)
support(con(e)(t))
= uP (−m) ∩ support(p(t+ 1))
, (32)
where the first and third equalities are by the definition of support sets via Lemma 4, and the second
equation is by our termination condition.
The last things that remains to be shown is that our termination criteria implies get-P(t +
2, G) =get-P(t + 1, G). Considering the simple cases first, if G 6⊆ P (t + 1) ∪ uP (t + 1), from
P (t+2)∪uP (t+2) = P (t+1)∪uP (t+1) we have get-P(t+2, G) =get-P(t+1, G) = 0. Oth-
erwise, if G ⊆ P (t+1), from P (t+2) = P (t+1) we have get-P(t+2, G) =get-P(t+1, G) = 1.
This leaves us with the case of G ⊆ P (t + 1) ∪ uP (t + 1) and G ∩ uP (t + 1) 6= ∅. From
P (t+ 2) = P (t+ 1), uP (t+ 2) = uP (t+ 1), and the termination condition, we have
G ∩ uP (t) = G ∩ uP (t+ 1) = G ∩ uP (t+ 2).
From get-P(t + 1, G) =get-P(t,G) we know that action effects that become feasible only in A(t)
do not increase our estimate of probability of achieving any g ∈ G ∩ uP (t+ 1) from time t to time
t + 1. However, from P (t + 1) = P (t), uP (t + 1) = uP (t), and A(t + 1) = A(t), we have that
no action effect will become feasible at time t + 1 if it is not already feasible at time t, and thus
get-P(t+ 1, G) =get-P(t,G) will imply get-P(t+ 2, G) =get-P(t+ 1, G).
To this point we have shown that if build-PRPG returns FALSE, then the corresponding ter-
mination criterion would hold in all future iterations. Now, assume to the contrary to the claim of
the theorem that build-PRPG returns FALSE at some iteration t, yet there exists a relaxed plan for
(A, bI , G, θ) that starts with a|+1 . First, if θ = 1, then Lemma 5 implies that there exists time T
such that G ⊆ P (T ). If so, then the persistence of our “negative” termination condition implies
G ⊆ P (t). However, in this case we would have get-P(t,G) = 1 (see the second if of the get-P
procedure), and thus build-PRPG would return TRUE before ever getting to check the “negative”
termination condition in iteration t. Alternatively, if θ = 0, then build-PRPG would have terminated
with returning TRUE before the “negative” termination condition is checked even once.
This leaves us with the case of 0 < θ < 1 and get-P(t,G) < θ. (get-P(t,G) ≥ θ will
again contradict reaching the negative termination condition at iteration t.) We can also assume that
G ⊆ P (t)∪uP (t) because P (t)∪uP (t) contains all the facts that are not negatively known at time
t, and thus persistence of the negative termination condition together with G 6⊆ P (t)∪uP (t) would
imply that there is no relaxed plan for any θ > 0. Let us consider the sub-goals G ∩ uP (t) 6= ∅.
(1) If for all subgoals g ∈ G ∩ uP (t), the implications in Imp→g(t) are only due to deterministic
outcomes of the effects E(Imp→g(t)), then the uncertainty about achieving G ∩ uP (t) at time
t is only due to the uncertainty about the initial state. Since the initial belief state is reasoned
about with no relaxation, in this case get-P(t,G) = WMC(Φ ∧
∧
g∈G\P (t) ϕg) provides us
with an upper bound on the probability of achieving our goal G by a|+1 concatenated with
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an arbitrary linearization of an arbitrary subset of A(0), . . . , A(t − 1). The termination sub-
condition get-P(t + 1, G) =get-P(t,G) and the persistence of the action sets A(T ), T ≥ t,
imply then that get-P(t,G) provides us with an upper bound on the probability of achieving G
by a|+1 concatenated with an arbitrary linearization of an arbitrary subset of A(0), . . . , A(T ),
for all T ≥ t. Together with get-P(t,G) < θ, the latter conclusion contradicts our assumption
that a desired relaxed plan exists.
(2) If there exists a subgoal g ∈ G∩uP (t) such that some implications in Imp→g(t) are due to truly
probabilistic outcomes of the effects E(Imp→g(t)), then repeating the (relaxed) actions A(t) in
A(t + 1) will necessarily result in WMC(Φ ∧
∧
g∈G\P (t+1) ϕg) > WMC(Φ ∧
∧
g∈G\P (t) ϕg),
contradicting our termination sub-condition condition get-P(t+ 1, G) =get-P(t,G).
Hence, we arrived into contradiction that our assumption that build-PRPG returns FALSE at time t,
yet there exists a relaxed plan for (A, bI , G, θ) that starts with a|+1 .
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